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Low Inflation: Potential Causes, Effects and Solutions
Christopher David Cotton
My dissertation focuses upon low inflation. Many developed countries, especially Japan
and the Eurozone, have recently experienced prolonged periods of below-target inflation.
This has been blamed for many economic ills including worsening the Great Recession and
generating a slow recovery, making monetary policy ineffective and leading to lower labor
market flexibility. I study what has caused low inflation, its potential effects and how it
could be prevented.
In Chapter 1, I look at how effective raising the inflation target would be in mitigating
the problems of low inflation. Many economists have proposed raising the inflation target to
reduce the probability of hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB). It is both widely assumed and
a feature of standard models that raising the inflation target does not impact the equilibrium
real rate. I demonstrate that once heterogeneity is introduced, raising the inflation target
causes the equilibrium real rate to fall in the New Keynesian model. This implies that raising
the inflation target will increase the nominal interest rate by less than expected and thus
will be less effective in reducing the probability of hitting the ZLB. The channel is that a rise
in the inflation target lowers the average markup by price rigidities and a fall in the average
markup lowers the equilibrium real rate by household heterogeneity which could come from
overlapping generations or idiosyncratic labor shocks. Raising the inflation target from 2%
to 4% lowers the equilibrium real rate by 0.38 percentage points in my baseline calibration.
I also analyse the optimal inflation level and provide empirical evidence in support of the
model mechanism.
In Chapter 2, I study to what degree the recent fall in inflation can explain the rise in
firm profitability which has been blamed for a rise in inequality. A theoretical relationship
between inflation and profitability is known to exist. I investigate the degree to which the
recent fall in inflation can explain the rise in firm profitability. My three primary findings
are: 1. The negative relationship between inflation and profitability does not hinge upon the
Calvo assumption. Raising inflation significantly lowers profitability under all common price
rigidities. The relationship can actually be significantly stronger under menu costs. 2. A
rise in the degree to which firms discount the future magnifies the effect; a rise in elasticity
of substitution can increase or decrease the effect depending upon the price rigidity. 3.
The profit share has risen by around 3.5p.p. since the 1990s. In a richer model with firm
heterogeneity, the recent fall in inflation is estimated to explain 14% of the rise. This can
increase to 29% if firms are allowed to discount the future by more in line with estimates
from the finance literature. I also provide empirical evidence for the negative relationship
between inflation and firm profits.
In Chapter 3, I examine whether behavioral features can help to explain why some
countries have persistently experienced low inflation at the zero lower bound. Economists
are keen to introduce behavioral assumptions into modern macroeconomic models. A popular
framework for doing so is sparse dynamic programming, which assumes that agents partly
base their expectations upon a default model which is typically the steady state. This means
agents’ expectations will be wrong if there are long-run deviations from the default model
and assumes agents can compute the default. I introduce an alternative form of sparse
dynamic programming which tackles these problems by allowing for long-run updating to
the behavioral part of agents’ expectations. I apply this to derive a long-run behavioral New
Keynesian model. Within this model, fixed interest rates yield indeterminacy and the costs
of remaining at the zero lower bound are unbounded. These results are very different to a
behavioral New Keynesian model based upon standard sparse dynamic programming, which
can yield determinacy under fixed interest rates and bounded costs of the zero lower bound.
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Chapter 1




Many economists have proposed raising the inflation target to reduce the probability of
hitting the zero lower bound (ZLB). Nearly all developed countries were constrained by the
ZLB during the financial crisis. Moreover, it is widely believed that average real interest rates
have fallen.1 This implies that average nominal interest rates will be lower going forward.
Consequently, there has been a re-evaluation of the risk that central banks will hit the ZLB.
Hitting the bound is bad for economic outcomes because central banks have less room to
lower nominal interest rates and stimulate the economy during bad times. Therefore many
economists (including Blanchard et al. (2010), Ball (2014), Krugman (2014)) have proposed
raising the inflation target from the standard objective of 2% to 4% claiming this will raise
average nominal interest rates and thus reduce the probability of hitting the ZLB.
It is widely assumed that raising the inflation target will not affect the equilibrium real
rate. The equilibrium real (nominal) rate is the real (nominal) interest rate on short-term
safe assets when there are no shocks. Standard macroeconomic models very commonly
assume flexible prices and/or a representative agent. With either of these assumptions, the
equilibrium real rate is unaffected by changing average inflation. This is also a historic
concept introduced by Fisher (1907) and is often taken for granted within policy discussions.
For example, Ball (2014) states that the long run level of the real interest rate is “independent
of monetary policy”. Thus, it is widely believed that raising the inflation target by 2p.p.
will have no impact upon the equilibrium real rate and will therefore raise the equilibrium
nominal rate by a corresponding 2p.p.
My primary contribution is to demonstrate a new channel by which raising the infla-
tion target will lower the equilibrium real rate. Once I account for household heterogeneity
1Holston et al. (2017) estimate that it has fallen by an average of 2.3p.p. since 1990 (across the US,
Canada, the Euro Area and the UK). Recent estimates of the US equilibrium real rate by Negro et al.
(2017), Holston et al. (2017), Johannsen and Mertens (2016), Kiley (2015), Laubach and Williams (2015),
Lubik and Matthes (2015) lie between 0.1% and 1.8%.
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(through either overlapping generations or idiosyncratic risk) within the standard New Key-
nesian model, I find that raising the inflation target lowers the equilibrium real rate. This
implies that a rise in the inflation target will raise the average nominal interest rate by
less than expected. Since nominal interest rates will rise by less than expected, raising the
inflation target will reduce the probability of avoiding the ZLB by less than is commonly
believed. The channel has two stages. Firstly, price rigidities imply that a rise in the infla-
tion target lowers the markup. Secondly, household heterogeneity implies that a fall in the
markup lowers the equilibrium real rate.
The first part of the channel is a standard, albeit often overlooked, feature of New Key-
nesian models. A firm’s markup is just the ratio of its price to its nominal marginal cost.
When firms set their prices infrequently, a higher average inflation level has two opposing
impacts upon average markups. Firstly, higher inflation means that when a firm does not
reset its price then its markup falls by relatively more since with higher inflation nominal
marginal costs rise relatively more quickly. Secondly, firms observe that their markups fall
more quickly and therefore set their markup to be higher when they do get to reset their
prices. It can be shown that with no discounting these two effects cancel out and thus aver-
age markups are unchanged by raising average inflation. However, with discounting, the first
effect dominates since firms care more about making profits in the current period and so do
not want to set their current markup to be very high when they reset their price. Therefore,
a rise in average inflation lowers the average markup. I demonstrate in Cotton (2019) that
the negative relationship between trend inflation and firm markups has significant effects
under all standard price rigidities.
The second part of the channel is that once you allow for household heterogeneity a fall
in the markup lowers the equilibrium real rate. Taking the example of heterogeneity through
overlapping generations (OLG): A fall in the markup lowers firm profits and thus reduces
the value of shares and of overall savings. A fall in the amount of savings ceteris paribus
lowers the consumption of the old relative to the young. This means the old have higher
3
marginal utility from consuming than the young. Thus, there is greater competition among
young people to save for when they are old and so the price of savings rises. As the price of
savings rises, the return on savings (the equilibrium real rate) falls. To my knowledge, this
part of the channel has not been covered in the literature.
This contrasts with a representative agent New Keynesian model where a fall in the
markup has no impact on the equilibrium real rate. In this case, a rise in inflation still
lowers the markup which in turn lowers firm profits and thus reduces the value of shares.
However, within a representative agent framework, the agent’s consumption path does not
depend upon average household savings since it does not matter what level of savings the
agent chooses to hold during their infinitely long life. Instead, without shocks, they just set
their level of consumption to be the same over time and thus the equilibrium real rate is
purely determined by the agent’s patience.
I estimate the impact of the channel through a fully calibrated model. I study the effect
of raising the inflation target within a model with standard New Keynesian features and a
fully calibrated life cycle framework. Within the baseline calibration, I find the equilibrium
real rate falls by 0.38p.p. when the inflation target is raised from 2% to 4%. This implies
that average nominal interest rates rise by 1.62p.p. as opposed to the 2p.p. that would
typically be expected and be found within standard models. Thus, raising the inflation
target mitigates the probability of hitting the ZLB by less than expected. When I reduce
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution from 0.5 to 0.12 , I find the fall in the equilibrium
real rate increases to 0.67p.p.
I compute the optimal change in inflation in response to a fall in the equilibrium real
rate as well as the optimal level of inflation more generally. To assess the optimal inflation
target, I find the welfare of the simulated path of the economy of my model under different
inflation targets taking into account the ZLB with calibrated shocks. Much of the motivation
for raising the inflation target is based upon the suggestion that the equilibrium real rate
2Recent research by Best et al. (2018) suggests an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.1.
4
has fallen. I assess how much the inflation target increases when the equilibrium real rate
falls by 2p.p. In my baseline calibration, I find this increases the optimal inflation target by
0.3p.p. When I allow for larger shocks which increase the probability of hitting the ZLB,
I find the increase in the optimal inflation target is 0.6p.p. I also analyze the level of the
optimal inflation target. The optimal inflation target is always around 1p.p. This is similar
to Coibion et al. (2012) who assess the optimal inflation target in a representative agent
model. Therefore, the benefits of avoiding the ZLB appear to be dominated by the welfare
costs of price dispersion even for relatively low inflation targets.
I also provide empirical evidence for my mechanism. I show there is a negative empirical
relationship between long-run inflation and the equilibrium real rate which supports my
hypothesized channel. In recent years, inflation and the real interest rate have both fallen
across developed countries. This would contradict my channel if the fall in inflation was
the only change that could have driven real interest rates lower.3 However, many factors
have been proposed that have lowered real interest rates for other reasons across developed
countries.4 Indeed, it is puzzling that real interest rates have not fallen by more. Gagnon
(2009) argue that demographic factors alone can explain the fall in the equilibrium real rate
while Eggertsson et al. (2017) argue that real rates should be much lower. I take this into
account in my empirical analysis by looking at panel data regressions of the real rate on
long-run inflation controlling for country and time fixed effects in OECD countries. The
time fixed effects allow me to control for any common change in real rates across countries.
I find a 1p.p. rise in long-run inflation lowers the equilibrium real rate by 0.61p.p.
There is a historical literature that looks at the impact of inflation on the equilibrium real
rate through non-interest paying money balances but it may be less relevant today. Mundell
(1963) and Tobin (1965) argued that when inflation rises, it becomes costlier to hold money
3My channel would predict a rise in the equilibrium real rate when inflation falls.
4Stories include: demographic changes (Carvalho et al. (2016), Gagnon et al. (2016)), global savings glut
(Caballero and Farhi (2017)), secular stagnation (Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014)), low productivity growth
(Yi and Zhang (2017)), high inequality (Lancastre (2018)).
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so agents save more in capital, leading to a fall in the equilibrium real rate. A key assumption
of this literature is that money does not pay interest. This has two important implications.
Since money does not pay interest, agents need some other incentive to hold money such as
the assumption of a cash-in-advance constraint or money-in-utility. Secondly, most central
banks in developed countries have now shifted to a framework where they control nominal
interest rates by paying interest on reserves in which case a rise in inflation will lead to higher
interest on reserves and thus no potrfolio shift to capital away from money. Therefore, this
literature appears less relevant to modern central banking. My proposed channel is very
different because it does not rely upon money holdings in any way.5
My model relates to several interesting literatures on heterogeneous agent models: 1. the
allocation of profits, 2. redistributional effects of monetary policy, 3. optimal monetary policy
with heterogeneous agents. Unlike many heterogeneous agent models, I allow for the endoge-
nous allocation of profits. Most heterogeneous agent models exogenously allocate profits i.e.
certain agents are assigned to receive profits. For instance, Werning (2015) considers how
these exogenous profit allocations impact the marginal propensity to consume and related
implications. I instead consider the case where agents only receive profits by owning shares
in firms which get traded each period. Thus, it is an endogenous feature of my model that
old people naturally consume less as a result of the fall in the markup.
Raising the inflation target within a heterogeneous agent model can generate interesting
long-run distributional effects. Raising the inflation target can have short-term redistribu-
tional effects which hurt savers and benefit borrowers by lowering the value of nominal assets.
Doepke et al. (2015) consider these short-term redistributional effects in detail. My paper
implies that there can actually be long-run redistributional effects as well. A rise in the
inflation target reduces profits and thus the value of shares and total savings. This implies
that old people, who rely upon savings, consume relatively less and young people consume
5There are many other papers in this literature. For instance, Stockman (1981) proposed a reverse-
Mundell-Tobin effect in which raising inflation raises the equilibrium real rate due to a cash in advance
constraint on investment i.e. you need to take money out of the bank a period before investing.
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relatively more indefinitely as a result of a rise in the inflation target.
I contribute to the literature on optimal monetary policy in heterogeneous agent models.
I investigate optimal monetary policy within a New Keynesian model with OLG features.
Lepetit (2017) shows that within a New Keynesian model with perpetual youth, it can
be optimal to set a positive inflation target because heterogeneity can imply that private
discounting is higher than social discounting. In this case, central banks raise inflation to
lower average markups. My paper is quite different because the primary reason central banks
want to raise inflation above zero is to avoid hitting the ZLB which Lepetit does not consider.
There is empirical evidence that supports my channel. Other papers have suggested that
raising the long-run inflation rate lowers the long-run real interest rate. King and Watson
(1997) consider the impact of raising inflation upon the real interest rate and show that an
increase in long-run inflation leads to a decrease in the long-run real interest rate regardless
of the restrictions imposed in a structural VAR model for US data. They find that a rise
in of 1p.p. in long-run inflation lowers the equilibrium real rate by 0.66p.p. Rapach (2003)
extends the analysis to 14 countries with a richer structural model. He demonstrates that
a rise in long-run inflation leads a fall of between 0.94p.p. and 0.59p.p. in the equilibrium
real rate.
In section 1.2, I outline a simple model that captures the key features found in the rest
of the paper. I then outline the full model (section 1.3). I discuss the model solution and
calibration in section 1.4. I use the full model to analyse how changing the inflation target
will impact the equilibrium real rate in section 1.5. I then consider the optimal inflation
target in section 1.6. I discuss my supporting empirical results in section 2.6. Section 1.8
concludes.
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1.2 Intuition through a Simplified Model
I break the intuition for the channel into two parts. First, it is demonstrated that a rise in
inflation lowers the average markup through firms’ pricing decisions. Next, it is shown that
a fall in the markup lowers the equilibrium real rate through multiple forms of household
heterogeneity.
1.2.1 Relationship between the Inflation Level and the Markup
A firm’s markup, denoted mt, is its current price, P
?





Firms’ profits depend upon their markup. If they set their markup too high, they will
not make enough sales. If they set it too low, they will make a lot of sales but with too
little profit on each sale. When firms have fully flexible prices, they can set their price so
that their markup yields the maximum profits each profits each period. In the common case
where firms face constant elasticity of demand, the optimal markup is just σ
σ−1 where σ is
the CES parameter.
Setting markups is more complex in the case with infrequent price adjustment. When
firms can only change their price infrequently, they are no longer able to set the optimal
flexible price markup each period. In the case of positive inflation: There will be two
important effects. Firstly, if firms do not get to change their price in a period then their
markup will fall. This is because their nominal marginal costs (MCt) rise (due to the rise in
the price level) while their price (P ?t ) remains constant. Secondly, in anticipation that they
may not get to change their price in the future and thus their markup will fall, firms will
set their markups to be higher than the optimal flexible price markup when they do get to
change their price .
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The impact of raising inflation on the markup depends upon the degree of discounting.
In the case with no discounting, firms will weight their profits equally in current and future
periods. This leads to a special case where the markup is unaffected by changing the level of
inflation since the two effects on the markup cancel out. However, when firms discount the
future, they will weight their current period markup more in their decision-making. This
implies that they set a lower markup when they get to change their price and thus that the
average markup is lower with positive inflation. As the level of inflation rises, the strength
of this effect will increase.
For example, in the case of Calvo pricing: Denote σ to be the elasticity of substitution
between goods, β to be the discount factor, λ to be the probability with which firms can
update their price each period and Π¯ to be the steady state level of gross inflation (i.e. Pt+1
Pt
).





Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)
] [
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β
]
(1.1)
When β = 1 so there is no discounting, equation (1.1) simplifies to give m¯ = σ
σ−1 so
raising inflation has no impact upon the markup and firms will set their markup to be at
the same level as without price stickiness. However, when β < 1 so there is discounting,
raising inflation always lowers the markup. This is easy to see in the extreme case of full




Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)Π¯
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)
The frequency of price changes does not affect the relationship at low levels of inflation.
If the frequency with which firms adjust prices increases, this would reduce the feedback
6The derivations are shown in appendix A.1.1.
7I prove that when steady state inflation rises the markup falls for all β < 1 in appendix A.1.1.
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from inflation to the markup.8 However, Gagnon (2009) demonstrates that the frequency
with which firms change their price does not appear to vary below annual rates of inflation of
10%. This makes sense because firms are likely to change their price for other reasons (like
idiosyncratic demand or costs) than just inflation so the frequency of price changes does not
need to change with low inflation.
The negative inflation-markup relationship also holds with price rigidities based upon
adjustment costs. The relationship would hold in the case of menu costs (fixed costs of
updating prices) or Rotemberg costs (convex adjustment costs of updating prices). The
intuition is that firms prefer to pay the cost of updating their price in the future (with
positive discounting) so they set a lower markup when inflation rises.
This is a general result. To get a negative relationship between inflation and the markup,
I require that firms set their prices infrequently and discount the future. Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008) demonstrates that firms have low frequencies of price changes. Jagannathan
et al. (2016) demonstrates that firms discount the future significantly. It is also worth
stressing that this relationship is present in the representative agent New Keynesian model
- nothing here depends upon household heterogeneity.
1.2.2 Relationship between the Markup and the Equilibrium Real
Rate
Simple Model I have shown that markup is determined by the level of inflation so I take
the markup as given and concentrate upon the real side of a simple model.
Firm’s produce using a linear production function.9 Therefore, output Yt equals labor
8This occurs because firms would set their markup for shorter periods of time on average which means
that the markup would fall by less before being changed for a given level of inflation.
9Here we have effectively assumed that firms do not face price dispersion. This would be true, for
example, under Rotemberg Pricing. The case with price dispersion generates exactly the same equations
but is a little bit more complicated to derive. The results are shown in appendix A.1.2.
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Lt:
Yt = Lt (1.2)
The real marginal cost of firms MCt will just be the real wage Wt:
MCt = Wt (1.3)
The markupmt is just the price divided by the nominal marginal cost which, by definition,
equals the inverse of the real marginal cost ( 1
MCt
so we can rewrite the marginal cost wage




The total real profits Ωt of firms will just be their real sales which is just their output
minus their costs of labor:
Ωt = Yt −WtLt
Yt can be substituted out with Lt (equation (1.2)) and then multiply and divide the first





I then apply the markup-wage relationship (equation (1.4)):
Ωt = (mt − 1)Wt
Pt
Lt (1.5)
Asset Supply I break down the solution into the supply and demand for assets. Asset
supply is the amount of assets that are available for households to hold. Asset demand is
the amount of assets that agents want to hold.
The only asset that agents can save in is shares in firms. The total real value of firms is
11
denoted by Zt. Therefore, asset supply, denoted A
s, is given by:
As = Z (1.6)
By standard asset pricing, we know that the price of buying b shares bZt must equal
the next period return on those shares discounted at rt+1. The next period return of those
shares is the dividends received from profits (bΩt+1) plus the price the shares are sold for at

































Figure 1.1: Relative Asset Supply under a Fall in the Markup
Two features can be observed. Firstly, in equation (1.12) a rise in r¯ lowers a¯s. This
makes sense because higher discounting implies the discounted sum of profits is lower so the
value of firms falls. Equation (1.12) is plotted in figure 1.1. The blue curve represents a¯s
with m¯ = 1.3 and the orange curve represents a¯s with m¯ = 1.2. Since raising r¯ lowers a¯s,
the curve has a downward slope. It may appear strange that the supply curve is downward
sloping but this is because the vertical axis is the return on assets. The return on assets
is like the inverse of the price of assets (since as the price of assets rises, the return agents
make on those assets falls). If the curve was drawn with the price of assets on the vertical
axis, it would have the usual upward sloping supply curve.
Secondly, observe that in equation (1.12) a fall in the markup m¯ lowers the relative asset
supply a¯s for any real interest rate r¯. This makes sense because when the markup falls, the
value of firms falls and thus the value of owning shares in firms falls. This can also be seen
in figure 1.1. Observe that the fall in the markup shifts the relative asset supply curve left
from the blue curve with markup 1.3 to the orange curve with markup 1.2.
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Asset Demand: 1. Representative Agent Next, I consider the shape of the asset de-
mand under three different household structures: 1. Representative agent. 2. Heterogeneity
through overlapping generations. 3. Heterogeneity through idiosyncratic labor.
In all standard representative agent problems, we derive an Euler condition of similar
form to the following (I assume log utility to keep things very simple):
Ct+1 = β(1 + rt+1)Ct (1.13)
A steady state equilibrium requires that a representative agent consumes the same
amount over time. If Ct+1 is more (less) than Ct the Euler condition requires that 1 + rt+1 is
more (less) than β. Therefore, the only way we can have a steady state is when β(1 + rt+1)





Equation (1.14) is plotted in figure 1.2. Like in figure 1.1, the impact of a fall in the
markup is considered. Observe that the asset demand is just a horizontal line since r¯ is
always pinned down. Thus, a shift left in the supply of assets lowers the amount of assets
held by the household but has no impact upon r¯.
The reason the equilibrium real rate is unchanged is because in steady state the path of
consumption of the agent must always be flat i.e. Ct = Ct+1 by the Euler condition. Relative
asset demand always adjusts to ensure this holds. Therefore, changing the assets held by the
household cannot disturb the path of consumption of the agent. Thus, the marginal utility
of the agent must always be flat i.e. u′(Ct) = u′(Ct+1) regardless of changes in the supply of
assets. The only way the marginal utility of the agent can be flat is if r¯ remains the same
over time by the Euler condition.
Asset Demand: 2. Overlapping Generations Now, household heterogeneity is in-
troduced. The implication in both cases of household heterogeneity that are considered is
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium under a Fall in the Markup: 1. Representative Agent
that the level of assets does impact the path of the household’s marginal utility over time,
meaning that the equilibrium real rate will be impacted by changing the markup.
I first consider a simple overlapping generations model based upon (Diamond, 1965).
Every period a new generation is born. Each generation lives for two periods and then dies.
The utility of a young agent is given by:
log(C1,t) + β log(C2,t+1) (1.15)
Log utility is used for simplicity. Young agents work L unit and devote their income to
either consumption C1,t or asset purchases At+1:
C1,t + At+1 = Wt (1.16)
Old agents merely consume C2,t+1 from their available assets. Their available assets are
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their assets from when they were young on which they have earned a return of rt+1:
C2,t+1 = (1 + rt+1)At+1 (1.17)
The amount the young save can be solved for by inputting equations (1.16) and (1.17)





So agents save some constant fraction of their income each period. It is simpler to rewrite
the agent’s demand for assets in relative terms so equation (1.18) is divided by labor income





In this case, the demand for savings is perfectly inelastic to changes in r¯. This is something
of a special case (due to log utility and only having two periods). In the full model, demand
for relative assets is not perfectly inelastic. However, the generation structure in the full
model is still such that the elasticity of demand is not perfectly elastic and thus the real
interest rate changes in response to a shift left in the demand for assets.
Equation (1.19) is plotted in figure 1.3 where the impact of a fall in the markup is
considered (as in figure 1.1). Observe that the asset demand is just a vertical line since a¯d is
fixed. Thus, a shift left in the supply of assets lowers r¯ but has no impact upon the amount
of assets demanded by the agent. The relative asset supply on this graph looks a bit different
to previous asset demand/supply graphs since each period represents a generation and lasts
for 25− 30 years so it is necessary to rescale the curves to get back to an annual basis.10
This is effectively the opposite to the representative agent case. The reason the impact is
10The non-annualized case is shown in appendix A.1.3.
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium under a Fall in the Markup: 2. OLG
so different is that a fall in the amount of savings held by the consumer affects the marginal
utility of consumption of the young compared to the old. When assets fall, the old consume
less relative to the young ceteris paribus. Thus, old people have a relatively higher marginal
utility. Therefore, the price of assets rises since young agents are keener to save assets for
when they are old. Consequently, the equilibrium real rate falls.
Asset Demand: 3. Idiosyncratic Labor Within this paper, household heterogeneity
is primarily introduced through overlapping generations. However, an extension with id-
iosyncratic labor is considered and it is worthwhile to demonstrate that a similar intuition
explains why the channel holds in this case.







Agents receive a wage W from the amount they work Li,t, which varies over time and
across agents, and some real return r on assets Ai,t. Agents spend their money on consump-
tion Ci,t and assets for the next period. Note that there are no aggregate shocks hence why
W, r have no time subscripts. Their budget constraint is:
Ci,t + Ai,t+1 = (1 + r)Ai,t +WLi,t
A key additional feature is that agents face some borrowing constraint, which is set to
be 0, and this limits the amount they may borrow each period:
Ai,t+1 ≥ 0
This problem can be solved by value function iteration. Ultimately, we get effectively
the same solution as Aiyagari (1994)11 The asset demand a¯d can then be computed for any
equilibrium real rate r¯.
a¯d is plotted in figure 1.4 where a fall in the markup is considered (as in figure 1.1). A
shift left in the asset supply due to a fall in the markup leads to a fall in relative assets and
a fall in the equilibrium real rate.
The result of lowering the markup is different to the representative agent case because a
fall in assets lowers the marginal utility in the next period by more than the current period
since it means that more agents will face a binding borrowing constraint in the next period.
11 It is necessary to make a minor change from Aiyagari which is to rewrite the problem using relative












Figure 1.4: Equilibrium under a Fall in the Markup: 3. Idiosyncratic Labor
This means that agents want to save more. In turn, this raises the price of assets and lowers
their real return in equilibrium (the equilibrium real rate).
The degree to which a shift left in assets lowers the equilibrium real rate depends upon
whether many agents are close the borrowing constraints. When the level of assets is high
(low), a fall in assets will increase a little (lot) the number of agents affected by the borrowing
constraint so it will raise the demand for savings a little (lot) and thus lower the equilibrium
real rate a little (lot). This can be seen in figure 1.4 and is reflected graphically in the steeper
relative asset demand when relative assets are low.
1.3 Model




I start by describing the general overlapping generations framework. Each agent lives for M
periods. Agents born in different periods overlap. An agent is denoted by its age in periods
so an agent born i periods ago is denoted i. Therefore, the M cohorts in any given period
are denoted 0, . . . ,M − 1. Each period: new agents are born (cohort 0), the oldest agents
from the previous period (cohort M − 1 at time t − 1) have died and all other generations
mature from cohort i to i+ 1.
The population of the cohort born at time t is defined as Nt. The total population is
defined as Nt and thus Nt =
∑M−1
i=0 Nt−i. It is assumed that the population grows at a
constant rate of n so that Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt. Thus, the total population also grows by 1 + n
each year.
An agent of cohort i at time t has a budget constraint given by equation (1.20). An
agent of cohort i consumes Ci,t at time t. An agent of cohort i works for Li,t. Wt is the real
wage paid at time t for each unit of work. An agent can invest in bonds, capital or shares in
firms. Bi,t, Ki,t are respectively the bonds and capital held by agents of cohort i at the start
of period t (so they were chosen at t− 1 when that agent was cohort i− 1). The bond is in
nominal terms and pays interest rate it−1 at time t (denoted with a t− 1 since the nominal
interest rate is chosen at t − 1). Capital is in real terms and agents get a real return of rt
from selling their capital to the firm at time t. ω˜i,t is the number of shares of the composite
firm that agent i owns at the start of time t. The total number of shares issued is 1 so ω˜i,t
also represents the proportion of the firm owned by an agent of cohort i at time t. The price
of a share is Z˜t and it pays out a proportional amount of the firm’s total profits Ω˜t each
period. Assume the agent starts with zero assets so Ki,0 = Bi,0 = ω˜i,0 = 0. For ease of




+Ki+1,t+1 + Z˜tω˜i+1,t+1 ≤ WtLi,t + It−1Bi,t
Pt
+RtKi,t + (Ω˜t + Z˜t)ω˜i,t (1.20)
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The agent’s lifetime utility function when they are in cohort k is given by equation (1.21).
CRRA utility is used (equation (1.22)). Both endogenous and exogenous labor are allowed
for. In the exogenous labor case, the labor supply is fixed by each cohort so that Li,t = Li∀t
and the disutility of labor term v(Li,t) does not appear in the utility function. In the
endogenous labor case, the disutility of labor is given by equation (1.23) where η is the
elasticity of labor supply.Bonds are also allowed to have additional utility to the consumer.
This is not key to the analysis and is only used to easily adjust the real interest on bonds
when the optimal inflation target is considered in section 1.6. ub (equation (1.24)) is set
so that the utility on bonds simplifies to give a fixed wedge between the steady state real










































12ub (equation (1.24)) is set so that the wedge simplifies easily in the Fisher equation. ξ is some constant
utility from bonds. If ξ = 0, then the standard case without utility on bonds applies. Assuming ξ > 0
then the utility from bonds depends upon the nominal return from bonds It−1BtPt and the marginal utility of
consumption. It is assumed that the agent does not take into account how changing their consumption will
affect the marginal utility from safe bonds so that the condition simplifies easily. This is why C¯i,t is denoted
with a bar.
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≤ Wt+iLi,t+i + It−1Bi,t+i
Pt+i
+Rt+iKi,t+i + (Ω˜t+i + Z˜t+i)ω˜i,t+i
BM,t+M−k, KM,t+M−k, ωM,t+M−k ≥ 0
First-order conditions are applied. This yields arbitrage conditions on bonds (equa-
tion (1.25)), capital (equation (1.26)) and shares (equation (1.27)). Note that gross infla-
tion is defined in the usual way (Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
). Also observe that the only impact of the
utility on bonds (equation (1.24)) is to add the constant wedge (ξ) into equation (1.25).




(1 + ξ)] (1.25)
u′(Ci,t) = βEt[Rt+1u′(Ci+1,t+1)] (1.26)
Z˜tu
′(Ci,t) = βEt[u′(Ci+1,t+1)(Ω˜t+1 + Z˜t+1)] (1.27)
With endogenous labor, it is derived ∀i ∈ 0, . . . ,M − 1:
Wtu
′(Ci,t) = v′(Li,t) (1.28)
To make the model tractible, the share holdings by generation are rewritten in per capita
terms. Define ωi,t = Ntω˜i,t so that ωi,t represents the proportional per capita holdings of an
agent of cohort i at time t of firm shares rather than the aggregate holdings of cohort i at
t. Then define Zt to be the price of a per capita share in firms i.e. Zt =
Z˜t
Nt and Ωt to be the
profits paid by a per capita share in firms i.e. Ωt =
Ω˜t
Nt . Equations (1.20) and (1.27) become
respectively:
Ztu











All conditions needed to study the long-run equilibrium have been derived. However,
to consider the impact of shocks, it is necessary to make some further adjustments to the
household conditions.
Define the amount that agents of cohort i have available at the start of t from savings
they made in t− 1 as Ti,t (equation (1.32)). Define the amount that agents of cohort i save












+RtKi,t + (Ωt + Zt)ωi,t (1.32)
Observe that the budget constraint (equation (1.30)) can be rewritten as:
Ci,t + S
p
i+1,t ≤ WtLi,t + Ti,t (1.33)
Define Tt to be the per capita aggregate savings held at the start of a period t from savings
made at t − 1 (equation (1.34)). This can be computed this by summing the population-
weighted savings held by each cohort (
∑M−1
i=0 Nt−iTi,t) divided by the total population (Nt).
It is then possible to simplify this slight by rewriting the population structure Nt−i,Nt in




























Using the simplified per capita definition, additional variables are defined: Spt is the per
13A superscript p is used to represent the fact that these are savings held by agents at the end of t (which
is different to how capital and Tt are defined).
14Note that T0,t, S
p
M,t = 0 which makes sense since agents don’t hold assets when they are born or when
they are about to die.
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capita savings made at t for t + 1 (equation (1.35)); Bt is the per capita bonds held at the
start of period t; Kt is the per capita capital held at the start of period t (equation (1.37));









































Next, recall that the total holdings of shares (ω˜i,t) in a firm must sum to 1 i.e.
∑M−1
i=0 Nt−iω˜i,t =
1. Applying the definition of ωi,t = ω˜i,tNt implies that the aggregate per capita holdings of












Nt−iω˜i,t = 1 (1.39)
Inputting equation (1.32) into equation (1.34) and then applying equations (1.36) to (1.39)
yields equation (1.40). Equation (1.40) just states that the total assets held at t equal the
total return on bonds, capital and shares. Similarly, inputting equation (1.31) into equa-
tion (1.35) and then applying equations (1.36) to (1.39) yields equation (1.41).15 Equa-















= (1 + n)Kt+1
The first equality is just an adjustment of the summation index. The second equality uses K0,t+1 = KM,t+1 =
0 to adjust the summation begin and start points. The third equality adjusts Nt. The fourth equality is just
a definition.
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tion (1.41) just states that the total savings made at t equals next period capital and bonds




+RtKt + Ωt + Zt (1.40)
Spt = (1 + n)
Bt+1
Pt
+ (1 + n)Kt+1 + Zt (1.41)
Define the share of savings of each cohort to be spi,t−1 =
Spi,t−1
Spt
. The definition of equa-












Next, set Ti,t = s
p
i,t−1Tt. This implies that the amount of total assets that a cohort holds
at time t is proportional to the share of saving they did at time t− 1. Equation (1.33) then
can be rewritten as: 16
Ci,t + s
p




Final Goods Firm There is a single competitive final goods firm which aggregates goods
in different industries to produce a final good. There are J industries in total, denoted
1, . . . , J . The final goods firm has CES production and each industry has a weight aj in
16 We will consider a first order perturbation. A first order perturbation means that agents only care
about the exepcted return and do not care about about risk. Therefore, all cohorts are indifferent between
holding equivalently valued capital, bonds or shares since they all give a real expected return of Et[Rt+1].
This would also hold without a first order perturbation in a purely deterministic model without any risk.




Ki+1,t+1 + Ztωi+1,t+i+1 is known but not
Bi+1,t+1
Pt
or Ki+1,t+1 or ωi+1,t+i+1.
This does not matter when there is no risk since these assets will always return the same by arbitrage.
However, it does matter when there is risk since if profits fall, agents who hold relatively more shares suffer.
The model is kept simple by effectively assuming that agents hold proportional amounts of bonds, capital















Therefore, the final goods firm has the usual CES demand (taking into account industry
weights) for each industry good given by equation (2.21). The price aggregator also takes


















Industry Aggregator I allow for different industries with different weights and degrees of
price rigidity. This is done for two reasons. The primary reason is that allowing for different
degrees of price rigidities increases the degree of monetary non-neutrality which is otherwise
unrealistically low. See Carvalho (2006) for a detailed discussion. It is also more realistic to
allow for different industries with different degrees of price rigidity.
A perfectly competitive firm of firm j aggregates all the intermediate goods in that











Therefore, the industry aggregator has the usual CES demand for each intermediate
















Intermediate Goods Firms Cost Minimisation The output of an intermediate firm i
in industry j at time t is given by equation (1.48). Intermediate firms have Cobb Douglas




Real profits of an intermediate firm Ωi,j,t in a single period are given by equation (1.49).
They rent capital from consumers at real rate rt. They also have to refund consumers for
the depreciation δ in capital. They pay workers a real wage Wt for each unit of labor. A tax
(surplus) τ on renting capital and labor is introduced. In equilibrium, the lump sum transfer
is set so that each period the amount transferred to the firm equals the tax (subsidy) it paid
(received) on renting capital and labor (so the only impact of the tax is to adjust the cost
of production for the firm). Firms do not observe that the tax will be transferred back to




− (1 + τ)((rt + δ)Ki,j,t +WtLi,j,t) + {τ((rt + δ)Ki,j,t +WtLi,j,t)} (1.49)
Intermediate firms minimise costs in the standard manner, which requires that equa-
tions (1.50) and (1.51) hold. MCt represents the marginal cost of the firm before tax. The













Output and profits (equations (1.48) and (1.49)) can be aggregated to get equations (1.52)
and (2.26). It is also possible to write profits in the more usual form given in equation (1.54).
17I introduce the tax so the equilibrium real rate can be set to take a particular value.
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Ωt = Yt − YtMCtνt (1.53)
Ωt = Yt − (rt + δ)Kt −WtLt (1.54)
As part of the aggregation of output and profits it is necessary to define a price dispersion
variable νt (defined in equation (2.27)) which in turn aggregates the price dispersion of


















Rewriting Cost Minimisation Conditions in terms of the Markup The average
markup mt is defined to be the inverse of the marginal cost of producing one final good
i.e. equation (1.57).18 Profits (equation (2.26)) are written in terms of the markup in
equation (1.58). Using equation (1.52) as well, equations (1.50) and (1.51) can be rewritten





Ωt = (1− 1
mt
)Yt (1.58)
18This includes the degree of price dispersion because as the price dispersion increases, demand for
intermediate goods with cheaper prices rises even though these goods contribute less to making a final good
than less used goods with more expensive prices. Thus, more intermediate goods must be used to produce













Intermediate Firm Profit Maximisation Firms in each industry j have a λj probability
of updating their price each period. When they do get to change their price, firms maximise
equation (2.25) subject to the demand for their good from the industry aggregator firm






the risk-free discount of the future. Firms are allowed to discount by an additional βf .













− (1 + τ)MCj,t+kYi,j,t+k] (1.61)
Rewriting Price Evolution Equations Equation (2.28) can be rewritten as equation (2.29).
Equation (2.24) can be rewritten as equation (2.30). There is a relationship between inflation
in an industry and the relative price in that industry that holds by definition and is shown
in equation (1.64). And equation (2.22) can be rewritten as equation (2.31). These steps































Intermediate Firm Profit Maximisation Solution The solution to equation (2.25)
can be rewritten as the first-order condition (equation (1.66)) plus two auxilliary equations



























1.3.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
When investigating the long-run equilibrium, a monetary rule does not need to be specified
(since we’re just computing the steady state). In this case, just note that the central bank
holds inflation at some target pi?. However, a monetary rule is needed when investigating
the equilibrium with shocks. A similar monetary rule to Coibion et al. (2012) is used which








)1−ρi1−ρi2 , 0} (1.69)
The government is assumed to have no debt/savings:
Bt = 0
1.3.4 Other Conditions
In the main model, At = 1.
Total labor is just the population-weighted sum of labor given by equation (1.70). In the
19The one change is that the interest rate responds to the difference from output from its steady state
rather than its natural level.
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1.4 Model Solution and Calibration
In this section, I discuss how the conditions derived in section 1.3 can be used to do policy
analysis.
1.4.1 Full Conditions
In this subsection, the conditions derived in section 1.3 are summarized.
The household’s problem is summarized by 2M + 4 conditions: M − 1 Euler condition(s)
(equation (1.26)), two arbitrage conditions (equations (1.25) and (1.29)), the sum of savings
shares (equation (1.42)), the amounts of savings and assets (equations (1.40) and (1.41)) and
M simplified budget constraints (equation (1.43)).
The firm’s cost minimisation problem is summarized by 4 conditions: the cost minimisa-
tion conditions (equations (1.50) and (1.51)), the definition of output (equation (1.48)) the
definition of profits (equation (1.49)).
For the firm’s pricing problem: There is a condition for each industry for equations (1.64),
(1.66) to (1.68), (2.29) and (2.30). There are also two overall conditions (equations (2.27)
and (2.31)). In total, the firm’s pricing problem is summarized by 6J + 2 conditions.
There is one condition from monetary policy (equation (1.69)) and one equilibrium con-
dition (equation (1.70)).
In total, there are 2M + 6J + 12 conditions. These correspond to the following variables:






,Πj,t, νj,t, Uj,t, Vj,t}Jj=1
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1.4.2 Steady State
In this subsection, the long-run equilibrium (the steady state) of the model is computed.
I solve for the steady state in a similar manner to section 1.2. The relative asset demand
and relative asset supply are computed and then I find equilibria where they intersect.
Relative assets at are defined to be total savings held by agents at the end of a period (S
p
t )
divided by labor income (WtLt). This is shown in equation (1.71). The reason relative assets
are used is because then asset demand doesn’t depend upon the wage which makes the model
easier to solve. In graphs, references are made to ”annualized assets” which are just assets





The solution is broken into three parts. Firstly, the markup m¯ is solved for given the
inflation target; this is explained in appendix A.3.1. Secondly, the supply of relative assets
a¯s is solved for given the markup; this is explained in appendix A.3.2. Thirdly, the demand
for relative assets a¯d is solved for; this is explained in appendix A.3.3. It is then possible to
find the steady state by looking for points where the supply and demand for relative assets
intersect.
I demonstrate that the equilibrium must exist, is dynamically efficient and satisfies R¯ >
1 + n in appendix A.4.
1.4.3 Shocks and Log-linearized Conditions
In this subsection, shocks are incorporated into the log-linearised versions of the full set of
model conditions found in section 1.4.1.
Similar shocks to Coibion et al. (2012) are incorporated into the model.20 The shocks are
20The differences are that this model does not have a government sector so it does not have no government
shocks and productivity growth does not follow some trend here.
32
to technology, the risk premium, the Phillips Curve and the nominal interest rate and are
denoted as respectively a,t, q,t, m,t, i,t with standard deviations of the shocks respectively
given as σa, σq, σm, σi. The productivity, the risk premium and the Phillips Curve shocks are
AR(1) processes:
Aˆt = ρaAˆt−1 + a,t
qˆt = ρq qˆt−1 + q,t
mˆt = ρmmˆt−1 + m,t
Denote the log linearisation of X around steady state as Xˆ:
Xˆt = log(Xt)− log(X¯)





(Et[Rˆt+1] + qˆt) + Cˆi,t
Et[Rˆt+1] = Iˆt − Et[Πˆt+1]









































Firm cost minimization conditions (equations (1.50) to (1.52) and (2.26)) are log-linearized
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to yield:
MˆCt = rˆt − Aˆt + (1− α)Kˆt
MˆCt = Wˆt − Aˆt − αKˆt
Yˆt + νˆt = Aˆt + αKˆt
Ωˆt = Yˆt − M¯Cν¯
1− M¯Cν¯ (MˆCt + νˆt)
Profit maximization conditions (equations (1.64), (1.66) to (1.68), (2.27) and (2.29)
to (2.31)) are log-linearized to yield:







+ (1− λj)ν¯jΠ¯σ(νˆj,t−1 + σΠˆj,t)



























































































The monetary rule (equation (1.69)) is log-linearized:
Iˆt = max{ρi1Iˆt−1 + ρi2Iˆt−2 + (1− ρi1 − ρi2)(φpiΠˆt + φyYˆt) + i,t,− log(I¯)} (1.72)











1.4.4 Policy Functions and Simulation
In this subsection, the method used to simulate the log-linearized model is discussed.
Firstly, note that a standard DSGE model has been derived. Therefore, a first-order
linear perturbation of the conditions given in section 1.4.3 can be applied. However, any
first-order perturbation will ignore the ZLB in equation (1.72).
To capture the impact of the ZLB, a similar method to Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015)
is used. The basic idea is that agent’s choices at time t are solved for by finding what they
would do without shocks in the future if there was no ZLB. If the central bank would set a
nominal interest rate below zero in this case then the estimation is rerun with the central
bank constrained in certain periods to be at the ZLB. This process continues until a situation
where the central bank is not setting a nominal interest rate below zero is found. The exact
algorithm used is as follows:
1. Set t to be the first period of the simulation.
2. Assume that at t+ 100, without any further shocks, the ZLB will no longer bind.
3. Guess the following regime: The ZLB does not bind in any period from t to t+ 99.
4. Solve backwards from t+ 99 to t to get the policy functions for each period under the
guessed regime.21
21The computations used to solve backwards from t + 99 to t is the same as in Guerrieri and Iacoviello
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5. Using the policy functions computed in step 3, solve out for the path of the economy
from t to t+ 99 in the case where there are no shocks from t+ 1 to t+ 99.
6. Verify whether the nominal interest rate is always greater than or equal to zero in every
period. If it is not:
(a) If this regime is such that the economy was never at the ZLB, set that the regime
is now such that the ZLB binds at t but not in future periods. If this regime is
such that the economy was at the ZLB until period t + s, set that the regime is
now such that the economy is at the ZLB until t+ s+ 1.22
(b) Go back to step 3.
7. Take agent’s choices at t to be the simulation values for t. Now set t to be the next
period of the simulation and go back to step 2.
The difference between my method and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) is in step 6.
In my method, step 6 implies that if a central bank knows that it would hit the ZLB in
the future without additional shocks, it will lower its nominal interest rate to zero in all
preceding periods.23 Guerrieri and Iacoviello’s algorithm implies that the ZLB should only
bind in periods when the nominal interest rate would have been below zero according to the
monetary rule. This means the ZLB can bind in nonconsecutive periods and can bind in the
future even if it doesn’t bind today.
Guerrieri and Iacoviello warn that their method is a simple first pass and I find there
are advantages to adapting their method to what I have described here. Firstly, since it
is more general, the Guerrieri and Iacoviello method often does not converge in my model.
Secondly, my method works more quickly. Thirdly, I think it is more realistic to assume that
(2015).
22I have not encountered the situation where the ZLB binds from t to t+ 99.
23My algorithm could also be considered as a simpler version of Andrade et al. (2018) who also adapt the
algorithm of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). They allow for the ZLB to start binding at some period t1 ≥ t
and then stop binding at some later period t2 > t1. I effectively set that t1 = t always.
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if a central bank knows that the economy is likely to hit the ZLB in the future, the central
bank will lower nominal interest rates to zero immediately rather than waiting.
1.4.5 Calibration
General Parameters Each period is set to represent a quarter. Standard parameters are
set as follows: α = 0.3, β = 0.98
1
4 , δ = 0.1
1
4 , γ = 2. ξ is set to be 0 so there is no premium
on safe bonds in the baseline calibration.
M = 220 is calibrated to capture each quarter of life of an adult between the ages of 24
and 78. The simulation begins at age 24 to avoid having to worry about how to capture
college. Agents’ last year of life is 78 because the life expectancy of someone in the US is
currently just under 79 years.
With exogenous labor supply, L¯i (hours worked by each age) is set to match the average
hours worked of a person of that age in the American Time Use Survey between 2003 and
2016. With endogenous labor supply: xi in the disutility of labor function (equation (1.23))
is set so that when βR¯ = 1 we have that L¯i matches the hours worked in the exogenous case.
This is explained in appendix A.5.1. η is set to be 1 in the endogenous labor supply case.
The industry weights and frequencies of price adjustment are set to match regular non-
sale prices in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The elasticity of substitution between varieties
within industries (σ) is set to be σ = 8. This is in between the lower and upper bounds of
respective 6 and 10 used in Carvalho et al. (2016). The elasticity of substitution between
industries (σ2) is set to 1 as in Shamloo (2010)
24.
It is important that firm discounting is set correctly since it makes a difference for the size
of the first part of the channel. The degree of firm discounting is based upon the Weighted
Average Cost of Capital (WACC) which is the average a company is expected to pay to
finance its assets.25 Jagannathan et al. (2016) estimated that it was 8% in 2003 when the
24I actually set it to be 1.001 otherwise I would have to rewrite the indices since 1 is a special limiting
case.
25This is used since it is the cost to the firm of not obtaining funds earlier by setting a lower markup.
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expected ten year rate on real bonds (re) was 2.8p.p. Graham and Harvey (2011) estimated
it was 10.0% in 2011Q1 when re was 2.2%. Graham and Harvey (2012) then estimated it
was 9.3% in 2012Q2 when re = 1.3%. From these three suveys, the average wedge between







r¯ is set to be 2.06% when pi? = 2%. This matches the average real interest rate on treasury
bills between 1995 and 2007. τ (the tax on the labor and capital inputs) is calibrated to set
r¯ at this level.
Simulation Parameters The parameters needed to solve for the long-run (steady state)
equilibrium have been fully described. I now describe the parameters that are only needed
for the simulation.
The same monetary rule parameters are used as in Coibion et al. (2012): ρi,1 = 1.05,
ρi,2 = −0.13, φpi = 2.5, φy = 0.11.
Where possible, the shock parameters are set to be the same as in Coibion et al. (2012).
Therefore: σa = 0.009, σq = 0.0024, σm = 0.0014, σi = 0.0024, ρq = 0.947, ρm = 0.9. The
persistence in productivity is set to be ρa = 0.9.
1.5 Impact of Raising the Inflation Target
In this section, I consider the impact of raising the annual inflation target from 2% to 4%. 2%
is chosen to be the baseline level of the inflation target because that is the standard inflation
target among developed countries. The impact of raising the inflation target by 2p.p. to
4% is investigated since that is the most commonly proposed adjustment (Blanchard et al.
(2010), Ball (2014), Krugman (2014)).
Figure 1.5 shows the impact of the policy experiment on the supply and demand for
relative assets. The impact of raising the inflation target has exactly the same qualitative
impact as in section 1.2. The supply of assets shifts left since a lower markup lowers profits
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Figure 1.5: Baseline Calibration: Asset Supply and Demand
and thus the value of firms. Therefore, there are fewer assets available for households to
hold. It does not shift the demand for assets by households. Observe that a shift left in
the supply of savings lowers the equilibrium real rate and equilibrium relative assets. The
intuition for the fall in the equilibrium real rate is also the same as in the simplified model.
Households rely upon savings to consume when they are old. A fall in savings means that
households consume relatively less when they are old so the price of saving rises which is
equivalent to a fall in the equilibrium real rate.
Figure 1.6 shows the impact of the rise in inflation on the consumption path of agents
across their lives. A rise in the inflation target lowers the consumption of the old relative to
the young. This is because agents save less for when they are old as a result of the lower
supply of assets.
Table 1.1 shows the numerical impact of the policy experiment with the default calibra-
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Figure 1.6: Baseline Calibration: Consumption Path
tion.26 A rise in the inflation target leads to a fall in the markup of 1.07p.p. This is just the
first part of the channel where when inflation increases firms set a lower markup due to price
rigidities. Ceteris paribus, a fall in savings reduces the ability of older agents to consume.
Therefore, the consumption of the old falls relative to the young. The second row of table 1.1
shows that the consumption of the older half of consumers falls by 5.14 percent relative to
the younger half of consumers. Next, observe that agents hold 4.46 percent more capital
(relative to the representative agent baseline case). Agents want to save more in capital to
try to reduce their loss of consumption when they are old. Since agents want to save more,
the price of saving (the equilibrium real rate) falls. In this case, it falls by 0.38p.p.
Raising the inflation target would be less effective in reducing the probability of the
ZLB. A rise in the inflation target of 2p.p. only raises the equilibrium nominal interest rate





i=0 Ci)), 100(∆pi(log(Kolg)− log(Kra)), 100∆pir. The change in capital is relative to the case when
r¯ does not change (which includes the representative case) since I want to demonstrate that agents choose
to hold more capital than when r¯ does not change.
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Table 1.1: Policy Experiment with Default Calibration
Defaults




Change in r (p.p.) -0.38
Change in K (%) 4.46
by 1.62p.p. in the default calibration, as opposed to the 2p.p. rise widely assumed and
predicted by standard models. Since nominal interest rates would rise by less, this would
give policymakers less room to cut in bad times before hitting the ZLB.
Figure 1.7 shows how lowering the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) to 0.1
affects the supply and demand of relative assets. Recent estimates from Best et al. (2018)
suggest that the IES is 0.1. Lowering the IES to 0.1 (from its baseline value of 0.5) causes
the demand for assets to tilt backwards. The reason for this is because when agents have low
IES, they have a stronger desire to consume the same each period. When the real interest
rate rises, agents get a higher return on their savings allowing them to consume more when
they are old. With a low IES, they will then reduce the amount they save to rebalance
consumption back to when they are young. In this sense, the income effect of raising the
real rate dominates when IES is high enough.
Table 1.2 shows the numerical impact of the policy experiment under different IES.27
Note that the column with an IES of 0.5 is just the default calibration and matches the
results in table 1.1. A lower IES which pushes agents to consume the same in each period
implies that, when consumption of the old falls, the price of savings rises by more and thus
the return on savings falls by more. With an IES of 0.1, the equilibrium real rate falls by
0.67p.p. compared to 0.38p.p. in the baseline case. Agents can mitigate the fall in their
consumption when they are old by raising their investment in capital. Since agents with low
IES really want to consume the same over time, they invest more in capital hence why it
27The rows have the same mathematical expressions as footnote 26.
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Figure 1.7: IES = 0.1: Asset Supply and Demand
rises by 8.02% relative to the representative agent case compared to 4.46% in the baseline
calibration.28
Table 1.3, explores the impact of allowing for endogenous labor supply.29 Allowing for




) 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 1
Change in markup (p.p.) -1.04 -1.05 -1.06 -1.07 -1.09
Change in Cold
Cyoung
(%) -1.83 -3.11 -4.01 -5.14 -6.35
Change in K (%) 8.02 6.80 5.84 4.46 2.74
Change in r (p.p.) -0.67 -0.58 -0.50 -0.38 -0.24
28The markup falls by less when IES is lower. This is because when IES is lower, the real interest rate falls
by more which implies discounting falls and thus there’s the impact of inflation on the markup is lessened
slightly.





The other rows have the same mathematical expressions as footnote 26.
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Table 1.3: Impact of Changing Elasticity of Labor Supply on Results of Policy Experiment
Elasticity of Labor Supply (η) 1 2 3 5 10
Change in Cold
Cyoung
(%) -2.85 -3.68 -4.07 -4.45 -4.77
Change in Lold
Lyoung
(%) 4.65 3.01 2.22 1.45 0.78
Change in K (%) 2.17 2.91 3.28 3.67 4.02
Change in r (p.p.) -0.21 -0.27 -0.30 -0.33 -0.35
endogenous labor leads to a somewhat smaller fall in the real interest rate than in the baseline
calibration with exogenous labor (figure 1.5). The reason for this is that when the markup
falls and thus savings falls so that agents consume less when they are old relative to when
they are young, agents can choose to work more when they are old to substitute for the
loss in consumption when they are old. The extent to which they do this depends upon the
elasticity of labor supply. With a low elasticity of labor supply, they work 4.65% relatively
more when they are old than when they are young.30 Consequently, with a low elasticity
of labor supply, households also choose to invest relatively less in capital since they are
replacing consumption when they are old through working when they are older instead. The
fall in the equilibrium real rate lessens when households have a low elasticity of labor supply.
As the elasticity of labor supply gets large, the model convergs back to the exogenous labor
supply case in table 1.1.
I also explore the impact of idiosyncratic labor shocks. Appendix A.7 examines how
idiosyncratic labor shocks can be embedded within the New Keynesian life cycle model of
section 1.3. Figure 1.8 shows the impact of adding idiosyncratic labor shocks. The blue,
orange and green curves are identical to figure 1.5. The blue and orange curves are the
supply of relative assets respectively before and after the shift left in relative asset supply
due to a rise in the inflation target. The green curve is the demand for relative assets with
OLG households and no idiosyncratic labor shocks. The dashed red curve represents the
30Define old agents to be those above the average age and those who are young to be below the average
age.
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Figure 1.8: OLG with Idiosyncratic Labor Shocks: Asset Supply and Demand
OLG model with idiosyncratic labor included. The only effective impact is that the demand
for relative assets shifts out. The intuition for this is that households face more risk so they
want to save more as a precaution against this risk. However, there does not appear to be a
substantive impact on the degree to which the real interest rate falls following the shift left
in the supply of assets.
1.6 Optimal Inflation Target
In this section, I analyse the optimal inflation target. The main aim here is to investigate how
the optimal inflation target changes in response to a fall in the equilibrium real interest rate.
I am interested in this because much of the motivation for raising the inflation target has
focused upon the apparent recent fall in the equilibrium real rate in much of the developed
world which makes the probability of hitting the ZLB more likely. I also investigate the level
of the optimal inflation target.
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To consider these questions, the economy is simulated over 1, 000 periods (250 years).
A set of shocks is drawn from the calibrated shock distributions and these same shocks are
used in every simulation. The welfare (the population-weighted utility averaged across all
periods) is then computed under different inflation targets. To capture the impact of a fall in
the equilibrium real rate, we investigate what happens when agents’ premium on safe bonds
rises by 2p.p. which implies that ξ = −0.02. I choose to model a fall in the equilibrium real
rate as an increase in the desire for safe assets because this is often used to explain the fall
in the equilibrium real rate and because this does not have any impact upon asset demand
or asset supply so it is easier to isolate the impact of the change.
The welfare under the baseline calibration is displayed in figure 1.9. The blue line repre-
sents the welfare under the baseline equilibrium real rate (2.07%). The orange line represents
the welfare under a 2p.p. lower equilibrium real rate. For a low inflation target, the welfare
under the lower equilibrium real rate is lower. This is because under low levels of inflation
a lower equilibrium real rate implies a higher probability of hitting the ZLB which implies
lower welfare. However, for a higher inflation target, the welfare is identical. Figure 1.10
shows the probability of hitting the ZLB in each case. The probability is higher for the lower
equilibrium real rate case when the inflation target is low. However, once the inflation target
is high enough, there is no probability of hitting the ZLB in either case so the welfare is
identical. The fall in the equilibrium real rate implies that the optimal inflation target rises
by 0.3p.p. from 0.6% to 0.9%.
The baseline calibration does not generate shocks that hit the ZLB very frequently.
Larger shocks are allowed for by scaling up each of the shock standard deviations by a factor
of 1.5. The revised welfare and probability of hitting the ZLB are shown in figure 1.11 and
figure 1.12 respectively. The larger shocks mean that under a low equilibrium real rate, there
is a higher probability of hitting the ZLB. This implies that the optimal inflation target rises
by more when the equilibrium real rate falls. The fall in the equilibrium real rate of 2p.p.
leads to a rise of 0.6p.p. in the optimal inflation target from 0.6p.p. to 1.2p.p.
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Figure 1.9: Welfare under Baseline Calibration
Figure 1.10: Probability of Hitting the ZLB under Baseline Calibration
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Figure 1.11: Welfare under Larger Shocks
Figure 1.12: Probability of Hitting the ZLB under Larger Shocks
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The simulations imply that the fall in the equilibrium real rate does not generate a large
increase in the optimal inflation target. In the high shock case, the increase was only 0.6p.p.
The intuition for why is that the probability of hitting the zero lower bound falls quickly
when the inflation target is raised. Thus, the benefits of raising the inflation target are
quickly outweighed by the increased costs of price dispersion.
In all cases that have been considered, the inflation target is not much more than 1%.
This similar to the representative agent case. The optimal inflation target is low because of
the high costs of price dispersion. Even once size of the shocks is increased and the ZLB binds
more, the costs of inflation through higher price dispersion seem to dominate the benefits of
avoiding the ZLB. This also appears to be true in the representative case since Coibion et al.
(2012) compute an optimal inflation target of around 1% in a representative agent model
with the ZLB.
1.7 Empirical Evidence
In this section, I provide reduced form empirical estimates of the impact of a change in
trend inflation on the equilibrium real interest rate. This complements existing structural
analysis. I first consider the relationship between long-run inflation and the equilibrium real
rate. The mechanism I propose implies that a rise in long-run inflation lowers the equilibrium
real rate. There is existing empirical evidence for this. Both King and Watson (1997) and
Rapach (2003) find such a relationship using structural VAR methods. To complement this
existing evidence, I conduct a reduced form analysis of the relationship.
A problem with studying the reduced form relationship between long-run inflation and
the equilibrium real rate is correlated trends. Inflation has trended down in recent years at
the same time as the equilibrium real rate has fallen. If the fall in inflation was the only
reason for the fall in the equilibrium real rate then this would imply my channel is incorrect.
However, there are many other reasons why the equilibrium real rate has fallen. Therefore,
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since real rates have fallen at the same time as inflation has fallen but for reasons other than
the fall in inflation, a simple regression of the equilibrium real rate on inflation is likely to
produce a positively biased coefficient.
To overcome common trends in inflation and real rates, I conduct panel data regressions
with time fixed effects. Using time fixed effects means that the common global trend in real
rates can be controlled for. It is then possible to assess whether higher relative inflation is
associated with a positive or negative deviation from the global trend in real rates. If other
factors that cause deviations from the global trend in real rates for a country are uncorrelated
with that country’s inflation level then this relationship is causal.
Regression: Equation (1.73) shows the estimated model. αi represents country fixed
effects i.e. whether the real interest rate is systematically higher in a country. δt represents
the time fixed effects. β is the coefficient of interest which represents the change in the real
interest rate relative to the global trend associated with a 1p.p. rise in long-run inflation.
Controls are also included.
ri,t = αi + δt + βInflationi,t + ΓControlst + ui,t (1.73)
The panel is limited to OECD members. Annual data is used. Long-run inflation
(Inflationi,t) is measured as the moving average of the current and previous four years
of CPI inflation.31 32 The real interest rate is measured by the 10 year expected return on
safe bonds. The 10 year real rate is used since there is more data availability and its likely
to be a much less noisy measure of the equilibrium real rate. To measure the 10 year real
rate the measure of long-run inflation is subtracted from the nominal interest rate on 10 year
31It may seem strange that the regressor is not the inflation target but nearly all inflation targets have
not changed since they were introduced so the inflation target would be almost completely captured by the
country fixed effects (αi).
32Varying the measure to a different moving average does not appear to impact the results.
49
Table 1.4: Empirical Estimates of Relationship between Long-Run Inflation and the Equi-
librium Real Rate
RealRate10yri,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.167*** -0.196*** -0.607*** -0.904***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.069) (0.149)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 1151 1151 1151 833
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
government bonds.33 I also allow for business cycle controls.34 The business cycle controls
are set to be GDP growth and change in unemployment at t and t− 1.
The results are given in table 1.4. Without fixed or time effects a 1p.p. rise in long-run
inflation is associated with a fall of −0.17p.p. in the real rate. This falls slightly once country
fixed effects are introduced. It has already been noted that inflation and the real rate both
have a negative trend so it is unsurprising that once time fixed effects which remove this
source of positive association are added, the coefficient drops a lot to −0.61p.p. Controls
increase the strength of the impact. A causal interpretation of the regression without controls
is that a rise of 1p.p. in long-run inflation lowers the equilibrium real rate by 0.61p.p.
I verify these two relationships are robust. Table A.2 verifies the relationships continue to
hold with just OECD members that joined before 1975 (these regressions exclude a number
of mostly Eastern European countries that joined from the 1990s onwards). Table A.3
verifies the relationships still apply under low inflation. Table A.4, looks at whether the
result remain for the period before 2000 only. Table A.5 analyzes whether the relationship
33Computing the measure of 10 year real interest rates by subtracting current inflation (rather than the
measure of long-run inflation) from the nominal interest rate on 10 year government bonds yields similar
results.
34It is undesirable to have controls that capture the long-run state of the economy since these could
interfere in the long-run relationship between inflation and the real rate. Business cycle controls are short-
term and should not generate this problem.
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continues to hold during/after 2000 only. Spurious regressions are generally considered to
be less of a problem in panel data since we can control for common trends across countries
by time fixed effects and idiosyncratic trends within countries are unlikely to drive results.
However, I verify in table A.6 that the results still hold after differencing.
1.8 Conclusion
Many economists have proposed raising the inflation target in recent years. They argue that
this will raise the average nominal interest rate and thus reduce the probability of hitting
the ZLB. It is generally assumed and a feature of standard models that raising the inflation
target has no impact upon the equilibrium real rate.
In this paper, I show that once heterogeneity is introduced into a standard New Keynesian
model through either generational features or idiosyncratic shocks, raising the inflation target
will lower the equilibrium real rate. In my baseline calibration of a New Keynesian model
with life cycle features, a rise in the inflation target from 2% to 4% lowers the equilibrium
real rate by 0.38p.p.. Many of the arguments for raising the inflation target are premised
upon the perceived fall in the equilibrium real rate in recent years. I find that a fall of
2p.p. in the equilibrium real rate within my framework, raises the optimal inflation target
by 0.3− 0.6p.p.
The channel I propose is empirically realistic. It relies upon the existence of price stick-
iness (or other forms of price rigidity) and the existence of a consumer life cycle. Both of
these features are observable in the real-world. There is already structural econometric ev-
idence for my channel. I provide additional reduced form evidence which further supports
its existence.
The results of this paper provide valuable insights for policy-makers. A rise in the
inflation target will lower the equilibrium real rate and therefore lead to a smaller increase
in average nominal interest rates than is generally believed. This implies that raising the
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inflation target is likely to be less effective in reducing the probability of hitting the ZLB
than expected. And my welfare simulations imply that a fall in the equilibrium real rate is
unlikely to justify a large increase in the inflation target.
Going forward, my results imply that central banks should look at alternatives to raising
the inflation target . Frameworks exist that could help to boost inflation expectations during
recessions without raising long-run inflation. Price level targeting, either just for a short-term
period post-recession or for all periods, appears to work theoretically. Another alternative is
nominal GDP targeting, although this would have to be updated periodically to account for
changes in the trend of real GDP growth.. However, although these targeting frameworks
could raise expectations of inflation during a recession, they do not solve the problem that
central banks will likely enter future recessions with low nominal interest rates. How central
banks can best tackle a slump with their main policy tool dramatically constrained remains
a question that deserves more investigation.
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Chapter 2
Falling Inflation and Rising Profits
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2.1 Introduction
Many economists and policymakers are concerned about an apparent rise in firm profitability
which has seemingly lead to lower wages and greater inequality. Common explanations for
this trend are greater tolerance by competition authorities for mergers and technological
changes that have produced increasing returns to scale that help monopolies to develop.
In recent years, inflation has fallen. There is an established theoretical link between
inflation and profitability under the Calvo price rigidity i.e. if firms can only change their
price with exogenous probability. In this paper, I explore the theoretical and empirical
evidence for the negative relationship between inflation and profitability and the degree to
which it can explain recent trends. I have three main results: 1. The relationship holds and
is potentially stronger under non-Calvo price rigidities. 2. I explore the determinants of the
size of the relationship. 3. I find estimates for how much the fall in inflation has lowered
firm profitability.
Within the Calvo model, a fall in inflation raises profitability. The Calvo model implies
firms can only change their price with exogenous probability. When firms do get to change
their price, they effectively set a markup - their price over their marginal cost. With higher
inflation, their markup will fall more quickly if they do not get to change their price since
their marginal costs rise more quickly. Therefore, to maintain the same average markup,
firms would need to set a higher markup when they change their price. However, firms
discount the future and therefore are reluctant to set a high markup when they change their
price. Thus, on average, a rise in inflation, means that firms set lower markups and thus
make lower profits.
I first explore the relationship between inflation and profitability under other price rigidi-
ties than Calvo. I demonstrate that the relationship can actually stronger under menu costs.
One potential reason why is that firms do not want to raise their price due to the potential of
receiving idiosyncratic shocks in the future which would make a lower price more desirable.
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In this case, it may be better for firms to wait to raise their price, implying lower average
markups and profitability. A second potential reason why is that in the menu cost model,
unlike in Calvo, the frequency of price adjustment changes for different levels of inflation.
With low inflation, we can actually have a situation where firms update less frequently under
menu costs than in Calvo. Since firms update less frequently, they set their prices for longer
in which case the average markup could fall by more due to discounting under menu costs
than Calvo. I am still investigating the reasons for why the negative relationship between
inflation and the profit share can be stronger under menu costs.
Secondly, I investigate the key determinants of the size of the relationship between in-
flation and the profit share. Key factors are the degree of firm discounting, the degree
of monetary non-neutrality and the elasticity of substitution between goods. When firms
discount the future more, the negative relationship between inflation and profitability is
stronger since they are then more reluctant to raise their markup when inflation rises since
they care relatively more about the present. A rise in elasticity of substitution strengthens
the relationship under Calvo but weakens it under Rotemberg or menu costs.
We can break recent post-Great Inflation trends in US inflation into three eras. Following
the Great Inflation, there was an approximate 10 year period from 1983-1992 when inflation
was controlled but still elevated. From around 1993 until the end of the Great Moderation
in 2007, there was a 15 year period when inflation was approximately on target. Following
the start of the Great Recession in 2008 and during the recovery from it until 2017, there has
been a 10 year period where inflation has often been below target. I compare these inflation
and the profit share during these eras in table 2.1.
My third main contribution is to explore how much the fall in inflation from 3.82% in
1983-1992 to 1.69% in 2008-2017 can explain the rise in the profit share from 5.86% to 9.26%.
In an extended model with firm heterogeneity, a fall in inflation implies a fall of 0.47p.p. in
the profit share which is 14% of the observed fall in the profit share. If we additionally allow
for a more realistic degree of firm discounting raises this to 1.00p.p. or 29% of the observed
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Recent Eras of Inflation




Profit share is measured by corporate profits before tax (without IVA and CCAdj). Inflation is CPI inflation.
These variables are also plotted in figure B.1.
fall in the profit share.
I also demonstrate that there exists a negative empirical relationship between inflation
and firm profitability through panel data regressions of the markup on trend inflation. I
study this question by looking at panel data regressions of a proxy of the markup on long-
run inflation controlling for country and time fixed effects in OECD countries. I find a 1p.p.
rise in long-run inflation lowers the long-run markup by 0.28p.p.
There has been discussion of the theoretical link between inflation and competition. For
example, King and Wolman (1996) look at the relationship between inflation and the markup
under Calvo and Ascari and Sbordone (2014) investigate how a rise in trend inflation affects
the marginal cost in the baseline model. I believe I am the first to investigate how other price
rigidities affect the relationship, summarize the determinants of the size of the relationship
and to try to obtain comprehensive model-based estimates of the effect of raising inflation
on firm profitability.
Other papers have also suggested that raising the long-run inflation rate lowers the
markup. Be´nabou (1992) finds that raising inflation by 1p.p. lowers the markup by 0.36p.p.
using a relatively reduced form approach with just US data. Banerjee and Russell (2001)
apply a structural VAR approach to the G7 countries and Australia. They find that a 1p.p.
rise in annual steady state inflation generates a fall of between 0.3p.p. and 2p.p. in the
long-run markup.
In section 2, I introduce a simple model. In section 3, I use this simple model to examine
the determinants of the size of the theoretical relationship between inflation and profitability.
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In sections 4 and 5, I respectively introduce a fuller model and examine the size relationship
in this case and how much the relationship can explain recent trends. Section 6 looks at
empirical analysis for the relationship and section 7 concludes.
2.2 Simple Model
We introduce a standard simple framework to consider the determinants of the size of the
relationship between inflation and profitability. We consider three different forms of price
rigidity: Calvo, Rotemberg and menu costs. To keep things simple, we consider the case
where there are no aggregate shocks so inflation grows at some constant rate each period.
2.2.1 Single Sector Basic Setup
We use the same basic setup to investigate the implications of each form of price rigidity.
Final Goods Firm We have a competitive aggregator firm which produces final goods




































p1−σi,t = 1 (2.3)
Intermediate Goods Firms There are a continuum of intermediate goods, each pro-
duced by a single monopolist. Each monopolist intermediate good producer receives revenue
from selling goods to the final goods producer. The monopolist also faces idiosyncratic real
marginal costs of production MCi,t. We know that the demand of the final goods producer
is given by equation (C.1).













We define idiosyncratic productivity so that we can express the idiosyncratic marginal

















We see that a firm’s real profits in a given period are a function Ω of a firm’s relative
price and relative productivity ai,t:







1For example, if production is a constant function of labor, Yi,t = Ai,tLt then the idiosyncratic marginal



















Profit Share We also note that since the final goods firm is competitive, total real profits










We can simplify this to yield:










From equation (2.6), we see that the profit share (the share of output Yt given to owners





We have the same basic final and intermediate good setup as in section 2.2.1. The key
feature of Calvo pricing is that firms can only change their price with fixed probability λ
each period. We denote the discount factor of the firm i periods into the future by Mt,t+i and
the price the firm chooses when it does get to change its price as P ?t . We assume constant
productivity for simplicity. Inputting the demand from the final goods firm (equation (C.1))





























































Steady State The steady state stochastic factor of the firm is defined as β i.e. M¯t,t+i = β
i.
Gross inflation is denoted as Π i.e. Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
. In steady state, the FOC (equation (2.10))






























+ (1− λ)νt−1Πσt (2.12)




















1− (1− λ)Π¯σ (2.13)






+ (1− λ)Πσ−1t (2.14)








[1− (1− λ)Π¯σ−1] (2.15)












This allows us to compute the profit share by equation (2.8).
2.2.3 Rotemberg Pricing
We have the same basic final and intermediate good setup as in section 2.2.1. The key feature
of Rotemberg pricing is that firms have to pay a convex adjustment cost to update their price
from whatever price they set in the previous period. Thus, unlike Calvo, they can change
their price every period but have to pay a cost when they do so. The cost is the square
of the log change in prices multiplied by the cost factor µ and output. Multiply the cost
by output is a common assumption which helps to simplify the Math. We assume constant
productivity for simplicity. Inputting the demand from the final goods firm (equation (C.1))
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[P ?t ] : YtP
σ−1



















Multiply by Pt and applying Pt = P
?
t :
µYt log(Πt) = Yt((1− σ) + σMCt) + µEt[Mt,t+1Yt+1 log(Πt+1)] (2.17)
We assume that Mt,t+1 = β
Yt
Yt+1
. This is the correct stochastic discount factor to use







. In this case, equation (2.17) simplifies to:
µ log(Πt) = σMCt − (σ − 1) + βµEt[log(Πt+1)] (2.18)
Applying steady state to equation (2.18) yields:
σM¯C − (σ − 1) = (1− β)µ log(Π¯) (2.19)
2.2.4 Menu Costs
We have the same basic final and intermediate good setup as in section 2.2.1. They key
feature of menu costs is that if firms update their price, they have to pay a cost µ. If they
do update their price, they pick a new optimal relative price p?i,t. If they do not change their
price their absolute price is unchanged but, in relative terms, the price will fall (assuming
positive inflation) by Π¯ in relative terms.
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We represent the problem agents face as a value function iteration in equation (2.20).
The states are the relative price of the firm in the preceding period pi,t−1 and their current
relative productivity ai,t. Each period, they choose one of two options: Firstly, they can
reset their price and pay cost µ (the first option in the curly bracket). Secondly, they can
not change their price in which case their relative price changes by (Π¯ (the second option in
the curly bracket). This problem can be solved by standard value function iteration.




[Ω(p?i,t, ai,t)− µ+ βEt[V (p?i,t, ai,t+1)]],Ω(
pi,t−1
Π?






Partial equilibrium: If we take MC as given (the marginal cost is part of the profit
function): Using the value functions computed, we can then compute the optimal reset price
and the price ranges under which a firm will change their price for each productivity. This
allows us to get the distribution of prices chosen by all firms.
General equilibrium: Under general equilibrium, we can no longer take MC as given and
must solve for it. To do this, we keep solving for the distribution of prices under MC taking
into account the level of inflation Π¯ until we find the MC that aggregates relative prices to
1 according to equation (2.3).
2.2.5 Parameterization
Each period represents one month. The baseline value for β is 0.96
1
12 which is standard. The
elasticity of substitution between varieties within industries (σ) is set to be σ = 8. This is in
between the lower and upper bounds of respective 6 and 10 used in Carvalho et al. (2016).
For the standard Calvo model, we set λ = 0.1. This is in the range of the monthly
frequency of price changes including price changes due to substitutions between different
sectors found by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
The Rotemberg model yields identical log-linearised results as the Calvo model when
inflation is zero - see appendix B.2.2. We therefore set µ = 69.15 by equation (B.5) which
63
Table 2.2: Relationship between Inflation and the Profit Share under Alternative Price
Rigidities Summary Table
Inflation (p.p.) 0 2 4
Calvo 12.50 12.44 12.35
Rotemberg 12.50 12.44 12.36
Menu Cost Model 12.50 12.34 12.23
means that the Rotemberg pricing matches the Calvo pricing case around zero inflation.
For the menu cost model, we set µ = 0.0407. This is calibrated so that the monthly
frequency of price changes equals 8.7%. This matches the frequency of price changes, not
including price changes due to substitutions, in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The rea-
son we do not include price changes due to subsitutions, unlike in the Calvo parameter-
ization, is because the logic of a menu costs model is based upon an argument in Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2008) that price changes are only made because it is optimal for
firms to reset their price. We set the idiosyncratic productivity to be an AR(1) process
log(Ai,t) = ρa log(Ai,t−1) + i,t, i,t ∼ N(0, σ2a) where ρa = 0.66, σa = 0.0428 which are param-
eters taken from a partial equilibrium menu cost model in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
This process is modeled using the method of Tauchen with 30 grid points.
2.3 Determinants of the Long Run Relationship be-
tween Inflation and Profit Share
2.3.1 Form of Price Rigidity
Figure 2.1 displays how a rise in inflation affects profitability under different price rigidities.
The results are summarized in table 2.2. We observe that under standard price rigidities, a
rise in inflation lowers profitability.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that under Calvo pricing when inflation rises, the profitability of
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Figure 2.1: Relationship Between Inflation and the Profit Share under Alternative Forms of
Price Rigidity
firms always falls as long as firms discount the future. A firm’s problem is to set its optimal
markup (price over marginal cost). Without price rigidity, a firm’s optimal markup is just
a tradeoff between maxmizing demand and profits on each good sold. Under Calvo pricing,
firms also have to tradeoff how the markup they set when they get to change their price
will change if they do not get to reset their price in future periods. With higher inflation,
firms should set a higher markup when they get to change their price since under higher
inflation, a firm’s markup is likely to fall by more (since marginal costs rise more quickly)
before firms can next reset their price. However, firms do not want to set a high markup
in the current period since they care more about current profits than future profits due to
discounting. Therefore, they do not raise their markups a lot in the current period meaning
that on average firms’ markups fall.
Theorem 1 (Calvo Pricing: Inflation and the Profit Share). Under Calvo pricing with β < 1,
raising inflation lowers the profit share.
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Proof. See appendix B.3.1.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that under Rotemberg pricing when inflation rises, the prof-
itability of firms always falls as long as firms discount the future. Under Rotemberg pricing,
firms face convex adjustment costs of updating their price. If inflation rises, it requires firms
to raise their price by more each period and therefore pay a higher marginal adjustment
costs each period. Firms discount the future so they prefer to put off paying the adjustment
cost until subsequent periods. Therefore, since a rise in inflation causes firms to delay raising
their price by more, the average price firms set over the marginal cost (their markup) falls
when inflation rises.
Theorem 2 (Rotemberg Pricing: Inflation and the Profit Share). Under Rotemberg pricing
with β < 1, raising inflation lowers firm profitability.
Proof. When β < 1, a rise in Π¯ raises M¯C in appendix B.3.1. We know that there is no
price dispersion since all firms act the same and thus ν¯ = 1. Thus, we see that when Π¯ ↑,
the profit share falls.
One difference we observe between Calvo and Rotemberg is that the impact of raising
inflation on profitability gets stronger as inflation increases for Calvo but not for Rotem-
berg. This makes sense because, under Calvo, a rise in inflation worsens price dispersion
by more under high inflation. Under Rotemberg, by contrast, there is no price dispersion
and instead the marginal cost of the convex cost price adjustment increases approximately
linearly (log(Π¯)) in inflation as we see in equation (2.19).
With menu costs, a rise in inflation also means that firms need to raise their price by
more each period as long as firms do not set their price more frequently. This would imply
that, with discounting, a rise in inflation lowers average markups under similar logic to the
Calvo case. However, since a firm’s pricing is state rather than time dependent, firms will
choose to set their price more frequently. This will counteract the aforementioned Calvo
effect. Consequently, we might expect that the effect of raising inflation on profitability will
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be weaker under menu costs. We observe the opposite is true in figure 2.1.
One potential reason why inflation lowers the profit share by more is that a firm will
not want to raise its price in line with inflation because there is a risk that they will get
an idiosyncratic shock (for example a positive productivity shock) that would cause them
to want to set a lower price in the future. In this case, they would have to pay two menu
costs from raising and then lowering their price when they could have paid no menu cost
by leaving their price unchanged. We would not get this effect in Calvo where firms pay no
cost to update their price or in Rotemberg where firms prefer to make incremental changes
to their price each period due to the convex nature of their cost of updating.
A second potential reason why inflation lowers the profit share by more than Calvo is
that we parameterized the menu cost model so that the frequency of prices matches the data
under 2% inflation. With inflation below 2% prices will update less frequently than this.
Therefore, firms potentially set prices for longer and thus set lower markups on average (due
to the standard Calvo reasoning) than in Calvo itself. 2 I intend to further investigate the
exact causes of the shape of the relationship between inflation and the profit share under
menu costs.
2.3.2 Firm Discounting
In figure 2.2, the degree to which a fall in trend inflation from 2% to 0% lowers profitability
given the level of firm discounting is plotted under different price rigidities. With a higher
firm discount, firms care less about the future so they set a lower markup in response to a
rise in inflation. Consequently, a rise in inflation lowers the profitability of firms by more.
We can see this in figure 2.2.
We see that for Calvo and Rotemberg as β approaches 1, a fall in inflation stops having an
impact upon profitability. This makes sense because the reason why raising inflation lowers
2Additionally, the parameter for frequency of price changes in Calvo was based upon the empirically
observed frequency of price change including price substitutions, unlike menu costs. Therefore, at 2%
inflation, the frequency of price changes is slightly higher under Calvo anyway.
67
Figure 2.2: Change in Profit Share (p.p.) when Inflation Falls from 2% to 0% Under Different
Degrees of Firm Discounting
the markup and profitability relies upon firms discounting the future. We observe that a
fall in inflation raises profitability by less under menu costs but that there is still a large
effect when firms do not discount. This is because the additional reason for the relationship
between inflation and profitability under menu costs (that firms worry about having to lower
their price after raising them) does not require firm discounting to hold.
2.3.3 Elasticity of Substitution Between Goods
A higher elasticity of substitution between goods means that the demand for an intermediate
firm’s good varies more when their price relative to their competitors changes. In figure 2.3,
the degree to which a fall in inflation from 2% to 0% lowers profitability given different
elasticities of subsitution between types of good is plotted for different price rigidities. We
see that as σ increases the effect gets stronger in Calvo but weaker in Rotemberg and menu
costs.
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Figure 2.3: Change in Profit Share (p.p.) when Inflation Falls from 2% to 0% Under Different
Elastcities of Substitution Between Goods
In Rotemberg pricing, this implies that the marginal benefit of getting closer to the
optimal markup rises so firms are happier to raise their price despite the high costs of price
adjustment in the short-term. In menu cost pricing, a higher σ implies that firms will
change their price more frequently to get closer to the optimal markup. With more frequent
price adjustment, the degree of monetary non-neutrality falls, reducing the impact of raising
inflation on profitability. That being said, it should be noted that if firms set their price
more frequently, the menu cost needed to generate the correct amount of price changes each
period would be higher, which would boost the impact of raising inflation on profitability as
is discussed in appendix B.3.3.
In Calvo, however, the frequency with which firms change their price is fixed so we do
not get the same effect as in menu cost models. The costs of price dispersion increase when
σ rises because if there is a difference in firm prices, the final goods firm buys more from the
cheaper firm, meaning that less is produced from a given amount of inputs across firms and
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that profitability falls. There is much more price dispersion in the Calvo model than under
other price rigidities since whether firms get to change their price is not state-dependent.
Thus, when σ is higher, a fall in inflation raises profitability by more in Calvo since a fall in
inflation lowers price dispersion by more.
2.4 Full Model
We also allow for an extension of section 2.2.2 with multiple sectors.
Final Goods Firm I allow for different industries with different weights and degrees of
price rigidity. This is done for two reasons. The primary reason is that allowing for different
degrees of price rigidities increases the degree of monetary non-neutrality which is otherwise
unrealistically low. See Carvalho (2006) for a detailed discussion. It is also more realistic to
allow for different industries with different degrees of price rigidity.
There is a single competitive final goods firm which aggregates goods in different indus-
tries to produce a final good. There are J industries in total, denoted 1, . . . , J . The final














Therefore, the final goods firm has the usual CES demand (taking into account industry
weights) for each industry good given by equation (2.21). The price aggregator also takes



















Industry Aggregator A perfectly competitive firm of firm j aggregates all the intermedi-











Therefore, the industry aggregator has the usual CES demand for each intermediate















Intermediate Firm Profit Maximisation Firms in each industry j have a λj probability
of updating their price each period. When they do get to change their price, firms maximise
equation (2.25) subject to the demand for their good from the industry aggregator firm
(equation (2.23)). Firms discount future real profits by a fixed amount β. Intermediate










Like in the case with only one sector, we can aggregate the intermediate firms’ profits to
get aggregate profits:
Ωt = Yt − YtMCtνt (2.26)










































We proceed by similar steps to the single sector Calvo case to derive the steady state.
The steps are given in full in appendix B.4.1.
Parameterization I set β = 0.96 in the standard parameterization, as in section 2.2. The
elasticity of substitution between firms within an industry is set to be 8 like in section 2.2.
The elasticity of substitution between industries (σ2) is set to 1 as in Shamloo (2010)
3.
2.5 Results of Full Model
We now analyze the full model allowing for firm heterogeneity through multiple sectors which
was outlined in section 2.4. The results under the baseline discount factor and the low factor
are plotted against the results from the Calvo model with no heterogeneity in figure 2.4.
Table 2.3 summarizes these results. We see that allowing for multiple sectors implies that
raising inflation lowers profitability by more. A low firm discount factor, meaning that firms
care less about the future, magnifies these results even further.
Average CPI inflation in the US in 1983-1992 and 2008-2017 was respectively 3.81% and
1.69%. The profit share (corporate profits before tax and without IVA and CCAdj / GDP)
in the US in 1983-1992 and 2008-2017 was respectively 5.86% and 9.26%. Therefore, we
want to look at how much the fall in inflation from 3.81% to 1.69% can explain the rise
3I actually set it to be 1.001 otherwise I would have to rewrite the indices since 1 is a special limiting
case.
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Figure 2.4: Long Run Relationship between Inflation and the Profit Share allowing for Firm
Heterogeneity
Table 2.3: Relationship between Inflation and the Profit Share under Firm Heterogeneity
Summary Table
Inflation (p.p.) -1 0 1.69 2 3.82 4
Calvo 12.52 12.50 12.46 12.44 12.37 12.35
Calvo Multi-Sector 12.53 12.50 12.39 12.36 11.92 11.83
Calvo Multi-Sector with Low Firm Discount 12.59 12.50 12.24 12.16 11.24 11.04
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in the profit share from 5.86% to 9.26%. We see in table 2.3 that once we allow for firm
heterogeneity the firm profit share would have fallen by 0.47p.p. due to the fall in the profit
share. In this case, the fall in inflation explains 14% of the rise in the profit share from 5.86%
to 9.26%.
In practice, however, there is evidence that firms discount by more than the discount
factor of the household. This makes sense since firms face financial frictions that imply that
their cost of borrowing (their Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)) is higher than the
risk free rate. Jagannathan et al. (2016) estimated that it was 8% in 2003 when the expected
ten year rate on real bonds (re) was 2.8p.p. Graham and Harvey (2011) estimated it was
10.0% in 2011Q1 when re was 2.2%. Graham and Harvey (2012) then estimated it was 9.3%
in 2012Q2 when re = 1.3%. From these three suveys, the average wedge between WACC




use this in an alternative parameterization. It is also worth noting that these surveys also
measure actual firm discounting which is found to be even higher than their WACC would
imply. If we use this lower level of firm discounting, we find that there would be a fall of
1.00p.p. in the profit share when trend inflation falls from 3.81% to 1.69%. In this case, the
fall in inflation explains 29% of the rise in the profit share.
2.6 Empirical Evidence
In this section I present reduced form empirical evidence for the negative relationship between
trend inflation and firm profits. There is existing empirical evidence for this. Be´nabou (1992)
finds evidence for this using reduced form regressions on US data. Banerjee and Russell
(2001) find such a relationship using structural vector error correction models.
We can measure the markup indirectly through the labor share. Let’s assume that output
is a linear function of labor (equation (2.32)). Then we know that the marginal cost firms
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face will just equal the wage divided by productivity (equation (2.33)).





Integrating over equation (C.1) yields equation (2.34). Inputting equation (2.34) into











From equation (2.36), we observe that a 1p.p. rise in the labor share implies a 1p.p. fall
in the firm profit share.
Equation (2.37) shows the regression relationship. It uses the same basic panel data
structure as for the inflation-real rate relationship.
LaborSharei,t = αi + δt + βInflationi,t + ΓControlst + ui,t (2.37)
The panel is limited to OECD members. Annual data is used. Long-run inflation
(Inflationi,t) is measured as the moving average of the current and previous four years
of CPI inflation.4 5 The real interest rate is measured by the 10 year expected return on
safe bonds. The 10 year real rate is used since there is more data availability and its likely
to be a much less noisy measure of the equilibrium real rate. To measure the 10 year real
4It may seem strange that the regressor is not the inflation target but nearly all inflation targets have
not changed since they were introduced so the inflation target would be almost completely captured by the
country fixed effects (αi).
5Varying the measure to a different moving average does not appear to impact the results.
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Table 2.4: Empirical Estimates of Relationship between Long Run Inflation and Long Run
Markup
LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t 0.209* 0.304*** 0.281*** 0.298
(0.083) (0.037) (0.032) (0.178)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 813 813 813 721
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
rate the measure of long-run inflation is subtracted from the nominal interest rate on 10 year
government bonds.6 I also allow for business cycle controls.7 The business cycle controls are
set to be GDP growth and change in unemployment at t and t− 1.
The labor share is measured as the percentage net value added in production that is
received as compensation by employees. I compute this for firms only since we are interested
in measuring the markup which would be most related to firms’ labor share. This data is
taken from National Accounts at the UN and the OECD.8
The results are given in table 2.4. They do not vary very much once country fixed effects
are introduction. A 1p.p. rise is associated with a 0.28p.p. rise in the markup. Once controls
are added, the results are not significant due to a large increase in the standard error but I
do not think this is concerning since the coefficient itself is unchanged and we are primarily
interested in the third column regression without controls.
I verify these relationships are robust. Table B.1 verifies the relationships continue to
6Computing the measure of 10 year real interest rates by subtracting current inflation (rather than the
measure of long-run inflation) from the nominal interest rate on 10 year government bonds yields similar
results.
7It is undesirable to have controls that capture the long-run state of the economy since these could
interfere in the long-run relationship between inflation and the real rate. Business cycle controls are short-
term and should not generate this problem.
8Both the OECD and the UN National Accounts data for firms has some gaps. I take the UN data by
default and fill in gaps with OECD data.
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hold with just OECD members that joined before 1975 (these regressions exclude a number
of mostly Eastern European countries that joined from the 1990s onwards). Table B.2 verifies
the relationships still apply under low inflation. Table B.3, looks at whether the result remain
for the period before 2000 only. Table B.4 analyzes whether the relationship continues to
hold during/after 2000 only. Spurious regressions are generally considered to be less of a
problem in panel data since we can control for common trends across countries by time fixed
effects and idiosyncratic trends within countries are unlikely to drive results. However, I
verify in table B.5 that the results still hold after differencing.
2.7 Conclusion
I have demonstrated that this relationship holds under non-Calvo forms of price rigidity.
Indeed, the relationship can be stronger under menu costs, perhaps due to the incentive
to hold off on raising prices in case there are future shocks that make a lower price more
attractive or because a menu cost implies potentially lower price-setting frequency than
Calvo under low inflation. I have also demonstrated that the size of the effect is stronger
when firms discount the future more and can increase or decrease when the elasticity of
substitution rises depending upon the price rigidity. I have shown that, once we incorporate
firm heterogeneity, the fall in inflation from 3.82% to 1.69% would imply a rise of 0.47p.p. in
the profit share which would account for 14% of the rise in firm profits in the US. If a more
realistic degree of discounting by firms based upon the finance literature is allowed for then
the fall in inflation would imply a rise of 1.00p.p. in the profit share which would account
for 29% of the rise in firm profits in the US. I have also provided reduced form empirical
evidence for the existence of such a relationship. In summary, the negative relationship
between inflation and profits does appear to be general and of significance.
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Chapter 3




To resolve paradoxes and increase realism, economic models increasingly incorporate be-
havioral features. The dominant paradigm in macroeconomics, rational expectations, relies
upon the strong assumption that agents fully understand the economy in which they live and
can process information costlessly. Increasingly, economists are keen to relax the rational
expectations assumption for realism and to try to explain current paradoxes.
A popular behavioral framework is sparse dynamic programming. Sparse dynamic pro-
gramming was introduced in Gabaix (2014). It assumes that agents’ beliefs about shocks
are partly rational but also partly behavioral. The behavioral part of agents’ expectations
are based upon some default model. Typically, the default model is just the steady state of
the model.
Assuming agents have a default model poses two problems. The first is that if there
are persistent deviations away from the default model then agents’ expectations will be
persistently wrong. For example, if agents base their consumption upon expectations of
future income and that income rises persistently above its default then agents will persistently
under-consume and never learn to raise their consumption enough. The second problem is
that agents in sparse dynamic programming need to have a very good idea of what the default
model is. Typically, therefore, they need to know the exact steady state of the economy in
which they live. This is a strong assumption for a model that attempts to relax the amount
of information that agents need to know.
My first main contribution is to introduce an alternative form of sparse dynamic pro-
gramming based upon long-run updating which overcomes these problems. This framework
assumes that the behavioral part of agents’ expectations is taken from their current beliefs
which update every period based upon their new information. In this case, if there is a
persistent change to a variable then agents’ behavioral expectations about that variable will
slowly update to the new value. For example, if agents base consumption upon their ex-
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pectations of future income and there is a persistent rise in income above the default then
initially agents will under-consume but their behavioral beliefs will update meaning that
eventually they consume the correct amount. This assumption also means that agents no
longer need to know steady state. Instead, they just need to be able to have a rough idea of
the average value that a variable tends to take based upon recent observations.
My second main contribution is to apply this alternative form of sparse dynamic pro-
gramming to the New Keynesian model to derive a long-run Behavioral New Keynesian
model. I assume that the representative agent no longer perfectly views output and the
real interest rate which affects their consumption allocation problem. Otherwise, the New
Keynesian features remain standard. Gabaix (2018) presented a Behavioral New Keynesian
model based upon standard sparse dynamic programming. The key qualitative difference
between the standard New Keynesian model, the standard Behavioral New Keynesian model
and my model is the IS curve. In the non-behavioral IS curve, current output gaps and fu-
ture output gaps have a 1:1 relationship. In the standard behavioral IS curve, future output
gaps are discounted due to agents’ imperfect ability to perceive future consumption. In my
behavioral IS curve, future output gaps are also discounted but there is an additional term
that captures agents’ behavioral expectations which can update over time to re-establish to
1:1 relationship.
My third main contribution is to demonstrate that allowing updating to the behavioral
expectations significantly affects the properties of the Behavioral New Keynesian model. In
the standard Behavioral New Keynesian model, fixed interest rates can be determinate and
stable and the costs of the zero lower bound can be small and bounded. This matches the
recent experience of Japan where inflation appears to be pinned down and the Japanese
economy does not seem to have suffered dramatically despite Japan being stuck at the zero
lower bound for 25 years. However, once the behavioral expectations are allowed to update
in sparse dynamic programming, fixed interest rates are never determinate and stable and
the costs of the zero lower bound are increasing and unbounded. These properties are the
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same as in the standard New Keynesian model without updating. Therefore, by allowing
for updating to the behavioral beliefs, the properties of the behavioral model revert to more
standard properties and the paradoxes are re-established.
The form of the IS curve drives whether a model is determinate under a fixed nominal
interest rate. In the standard New Keynesian model, a rise in future output causes current
output to rise due to consumption smoothing and due to the fact that a rise in future
output raises expectations of future inflation from the New Keynesian Phillips Curve and
thus lowers the real interest rate. Thus, if current output rises, future output also rises
but by progressively less over time until we return back to steady state. We see that any
current output is possible and thus we see we have indeterminacy. This effect can only be
counteracted by raising the real interest rate through a more than one-to-one increase in the
nominal interest rate in response to inflation. In the standard Behavioral New Keynesian
model, however, we do not necessarily find these effects because part of agents’ expectations
of future output is fixed to be steady state consumption. Therefore, a rise in current output
requires a larger rise in future output and thus an explosive path. Consequently, we can
get determinacy under a fixed interest rate rule. Once we allow for long-run updating in
the Behavioral New Keynesian model, however, a rise in output means that expectations of
output rise in the long-run. This implies that if current output rises, future output eventually
returns to steady state and does not follow an explosive path so we have indeterminacy once
again.
The form of the IS curve also determines the costs of remaining at the zero lower bound.
In the standard Behavioral New Keynesian model, at the zero lower bound there is negative
output but the degree to which output can fall is constrained by the fact that part of the
agent’s expectations of future output is always the steady state. Therefore, output can fall by
a limited amount. Once we allow for updating, however, the agent’s expectations fall when
current output is below their expectations. Thus, over time, since the agent’s expectations
of future output get worse, current output falls by more and more and the costs of the zero
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lower bound are thus unbounded.
A related set of papers that this paper clearly relates to is Gabaix’s framework of sparse
dynamic programming. Gabaix (2014) introduced the basic idea of sparse dynamic pro-
gramming. Gabaix (2017) discussed how this could be applied broadly to Macroeconomics.
Gabaix (2018) applied this to the New Keynesian model to generate the Behavioral New
Keynesian model.
My paper also relates to a wider literature studying the impact of introducing behavioral
features into a New Keynesian model by other methods. One such paper is Woodford (2018).
Woodford considers a different behavioral framework where agents are rational up to some
finite period and then use a value function to capture their utility for the rest of time.
Woodford shows that applying this approach to the standard New Keynesian framework
with a fixed interest rate (or more generally a less than one-to-one response of the nominal
interest rate to inflation) yields instability in the long-run but not a multiplicity of solutions.
This is not identical to my results where I find indeterminacy and thus a multiplicity of
solutions. However, it is of a similar flavor in that both of the models imply that remaining
at the zero lower bound in a New Keynesian framework with behavioral features should
produce instability, unlike Gabaix (2018).
More broadly, this paper relates to recent papers on the discounted Euler equation. Typ-
ically, we expect that if consumers raise their consumption in the future by 1p.p. then
they will consumption smooth and raise their consumption by 1p.p. in the present ceteris
paribus. Euler discounting allows for the possibility that consumers don’t raise their con-
sumption today as much in response to future consumption. Gabaix (2018) introduces the
discount by effectively fixing a portion of the future expectations of consumption. McKay
et al. (2017) also introduce a discounted Euler equation model. The discounting there comes
from the fact that in the future with some probability agents will receive a fixed amount of
consumption. Broadly, a discounted Euler equation relies upon fixing some component of
future consumption or expectations of future consumption to be constant. This makes a lot
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of sense in the short-run or when things change on a one-off basis like in forward guidance.
However, in the long-term, this is not an innocuous assumption.
In section 2, I review the differences between the method Gabaix uses to solve for long-
term expectations and the method I use in the context of a simple consumption allocation
problem. In section 3, I define the alternative form of sparse dynamic programming which
allows for long-run updating. I then introduce the New Keynesian model setup in section 4
before discussing the alternative Behavioral New Keynesian models that result from different
behavioral assumptions in section 5. In sections 6 and 7, I look at respectively how allow
for long-run updating affects determinacy and the costs of the zero lower bound. Section 8
concludes.
3.2 Simple Example
In this section, we consider how sparse dynamic programming affects a simple partial equilib-
rium consumption-allocation problem. We demonstrate that the implications do not appear
reasonable in the long-term. We propose an alternative form of sparse dynamic programming
which yields the same results as sparse dynamic programming in the short-term but does
not suffer from the flaws of sparse dynamic programming in the long-term.
3.2.1 Setup
An agent lives for infinite periods. Each period they consume Ct which yields utility u(Ct).
They maximise their lifetime utility and have a discount rate β. Agents receive income Yt
each period. Any income that agents do not consume is saved for the next period and is
denoted St+1. Agents start each period with savings they made in the last period St on
which they have received a fixed return of r. We allow for behavioral expectations, denoted
Eb. Each period, they solve the following problem to compute their consumption today Ct
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St+i+1 = Yt+i − Ct+i + (1 + r)St+i (3.1)
The first order condition of the problem is:
u′(Ct+i) = β(1 + r)Et+i[u′(Ct+i+1)]
We assume that r is such that β(1 + r) = 1. We make two approximations which mimic
the effects of linearising without going through those steps. The first approximation we make
is that Et+i[u(Ct+i+1)] ≈ 1Et+i[Ct+i+1] which holds approximately under log utility. This yields:
Et+i[Ct+i+1] = Ct+i (3.2)










+ (1 + r)St (3.3)
We take expectations at t of the lifetime budget constraint (equation (3.3)). On the
left hand side, we input equation (3.2). On the right hand side, we define the log-linear
deviation of income Yˆt = log(Yt) − log(Y¯ ) where Y¯ is steady state income. We apply a










+ (1 + r)St
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In this paper, we are interested in what happens when we have long-run deviations from
the steady state. We assume that:
Yt+i = Y¯ ∀t < 0
Yt+i = 2Y¯ ∀t ≥ 0
In words, until period 0, we have been in steady state. From 0 onwards, income will be
double its steady state value. Note that this implies Yˆt+i = 0∀t < 0 and Yˆt+i = log(2)∀t ≥ 0.
3.2.2 Rational Expectations Solution
Applying Yˆt+i = log(2) to equation (3.4) and simplifying yields:
Ct = 2Y¯ + rSt
Inputting this value for consumption into the individual period budget constraint (equa-
tion (3.1)) gives:
St+i = St
We observe that consumption and savings are constant. We plot this in figure 3.1. The
parameters are set as follows: r = 0.05, Y¯ = 1, S0 = 0.
These results make intuitive sense. If an agent knows that they will receive higher income
x every period they will consume x more every period so there will be no change in their
savings over time. This is an application of the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman,
1957).
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Figure 3.1: Consumption Allocation Problem under Rational Expectations
(a) Consumption (b) Savings
3.2.3 Sparse Dynamic Programming Beliefs
The basic principle of sparse dynamic programming is that agents have imperfect expecta-
tions due to information processing costs. Since they do not want to expend energy trying to
formulate exactly what will realisations of variables will be, they rely partly upon a default
idea of what these variables will be. In Gabaix (2014), Gabaix demonstrates that we can
sparse dynamic programming problems by two steps: 1. the agent works out how much
attention to attribute to each variable; 2. the behavioral agent solves out the model given
their imperfect attention. However, in later work (Gabaix (2017, 2018)), Gabaix assumes
that agents have particular forms of inattention (for which their attention costs are not
specified) which produces relatively simple behavioral macroeconomic models.
We take the latter approach. In particular, we assume that an agent only compehends M
of the deviation in a variable i periods in the future from steady state (where 0 ≤ M ≤ 1).
In this case:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = MEt[Yˆt+i]∀i ≥ 0
Since we know that Yˆt+i = log(2)∀i then:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = M log(2)∀i ≥ 0
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Figure 3.2: Consumption Allocation Problem under Standard Sparse Dynamic Programming
(a) Consumption (b) Savings
Note that here we have assumed that even in the current period, agents do not perfectly
observe Yˆt which helps to keep the math simple but is not important.
3.2.4 Sparse Dynamic Programming Solution
Applying behavioral expectations from our simple version of sparse dynamic programming










Simplifying yields the following processes for consumption and savings:
Ct = 2
M Y¯ + rSt
St+1 = [2− 2M ]Y¯ + St
M = 1 is a special case where we agents perfectly observe future variables and we move
back to the rational expectations case. Otherwise, when 0 ≤ M < 1, we observe that
consumption is always less than income and savings rises indefinitely. We plot the path of
consumption and savings in figure 3.2. M is set to be 0.5.
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The intuition here is that the agent again tries to apply the permanent income hypothesis
and consume the same every period. However, they underestimate income in exactly the
same way forever. They anticipate that they will have an income each period of 2M Y¯ when
actually each period going forward their income is 2Y¯ .
To see why we get this result, we can rewrite the agent’s behavioral expectations as
follows:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = MEt[Yˆt+i] + (1−M) ¯ˆY (3.5)
The agent places M weight upon the correct expectations Yˆt+i and 1−M weight upon the
steady state of Yˆt+i (denoted with a bar). Since Yˆt+i is the log deviation from steady state
of Yt+i its steady state value is just 0. Therefore, when an agent has imperfect behavioral
expectations of a variable and there are persistent deviations in a particular direction away
from steady state, the behavioral expectations will be biased towards the steady state. In
our case, income is persistently higher than steady state so the agent underestimates income
and therefore consumes too little and saves too much indefinitely.
3.2.5 Long-Term Sparse Dynamic Programming Beliefs
In practice, there are two problems with the behavioral expectations assumptions we have
made. Firstly, we have assumed that even if there are persistent deviations away from steady
state, agents never learn. Secondly, we assume that agents perfectly perfectly know what
the steady state of the model is. To avoid these issues, we introduce an alternative form of
behavioral expectations:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = MEt[Yˆt+i] + (1−M)µYˆ ,t
where:
µYˆ ,t = αYˆ Yˆt−1 + (1− αYˆ )µYˆ ,t−1
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We assume that agents base the behavioral part of their expectations of Yˆt+i upon some
long-run estimate of Yˆ which they update slowly. Therefore, if there is a permanent increase
in Yˆ , the behavioral expectations will be biased downwards initially but will slowly rise to
take into account the permanent increase.
Moreover, this framework does not require agents to know steady state exactly. Instead,
they only need to estimate Yˆ based upon recent observations, which appears more reasonable.
Of course, if the economy has been in steady state for a long time, the expectations of Yˆ
will naturally converge to the steady state value of Yˆ .
3.2.6 Long-Term Sparse Dynamic Programming Solution
Applying behavioral expectations from our simple version of sparse dynamic programming
implies that the solution for consumption (equation (3.4)) becomes:
Ct = Y¯ exp(M log(2) + (1−M)µYˆ ,t) + rSt (3.6)
Therefore, their savings process is given by:
St+1 − St = Y¯ [2− exp(M log(2) + (1−M)µYˆ ,t)] (3.7)
Since we have been in steady state until 0 (Yˆt = 0∀t < 0), the agent’s long-term expec-
tations of Yˆt prior to 0 must be 0 (µYˆ ,0 = 0). The path of consumption and savings under
long-term sparse dynamic programming is given in figure 3.3. αYˆ is set to be 0.1.
Immediately after the permanent rise in income, the agent’s long-term expectations of
Yˆt are approximately zero so the agent believes that approximately Yˆt = M log(2), as in
the sparse dynamic programming case. Consequently, initially, the agent saves a positive
amount, as in normal sparse dynamic programming, because they underestimate the value
of future income.
However, over time, the long-term expectations of Yˆ update to take into account the
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Figure 3.3: Consumption Allocation Problem under Long-Term Sparse Dynamic Program-
ming
(a) Consumption (b) Savings
persistent deviation in Yˆ . In the long-term their expectations therefore converge to the
updated value of Yˆ = log(2). Formally, limt→∞ µYˆ ,t = log(2). This implies that agents
eventually come to believe correctly that their income has doubled and thus, in the long-
term, they consume this amount more and their savings stop increasing.
3.3 Long-Term Sparse Dynamic Programming
In this section, we formally define the alternative form of sparse dynamic programming I
introduce where the irrational part of agents’ expectations slowly updates. I also give the
standard sparse dynamic programming case for comparison.
We give the definition in the case of a standard constrained maximization setup. However,
it would be similarly defined in other cases. Agents maximise some utility function u each
period. They do this for T periods which is potentially infinite and discount each period by
β. Agents maximize over some control at+i give the process F by which a state xt+i updates.
u and F are both potentially affected by shocks t+i each period. Therefore, a rational agent
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xt+i+1 = F (at+i, xt+i, t+i)
Note that we allow for multiple controls, states and shocks so at+i, xt+i, t+i are all vectors.
Definition 3 (Sparse Dynamic Programming Approach). In standard sparse dynamic pro-






βiu(at+i, xt+i,mi ◦ t+i)]
s.t.
xt+i+1 = F (at+i, xt+i,mi ◦ t+i)
mi is a vector of the degree to which agents understand deviations in t+i from steady
state. ◦ represents the element-by-element multiplication i.e. (a, b) ◦ (c, d) = (ac, bd).
Gabaix (2014) describes in more detail the justification and derivation of mi. However,
in later work, Gabaix takes the degree to which agents understand deviations as given. We
follow the latter approach here.
Definition 4 (Long-Run Sparse Dynamic Programming Approach). In long-run sparse dy-







βiu(at+i, xt+i,mi ◦ t+i + (1−mi)µ,t)]
s.t.
xt+i+1 = F (at+i, xt+i,mi ◦ t+i + (1−mi)µ,t)
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where:
µ,t = αt−1 + (1− α)µ,t−1
3.4 Simple New Keynesian Model Setup
Here we describe the setup for the simple New Keynesian model that we will consider, under
different behavioral expectations, for the rest of the paper.
3.4.1 Households
There is a representative agent with behavioral expectations, denoted with a b superscript.
They maximize their lifetime utility where u(C) is their utility from consumption and they
discount by β. Agents receive income Yt each period. There is a nominal bond market which
pays off gross nominal interest of It−1 each period (denoted with a t− 1 since this rate was














We derive a standard Euler equation (except with Behavioral expectations):










The agent receives income from working and from the profits of the firm. Agents can




L1+ηt from working. Therefore, working for  units provides utility of Wtu
′(Ct) at
a cost v′(Lt). Thus, by a perturbation argument, we have the consumption-labor condition:
Wtu
′(Ct) = v′(Lt) (3.11)
Log-linearising equation (3.11) yields:
Wˆt − 1
γ
Cˆt = ηLˆt (3.12)
3.4.2 Firms
We use the standard New Keynesian firm setup with monopolistic intermediate goods firms
producing with linear labor-only production functions and facing Calvo price rigidities, and
a CES competitive firm aggregating the intermediate goods. By standard computations,
which are relegated to appendix C.1.1, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is given by:
pit = κxt + βEt[pit+1] (3.13)
where pit is log-linearised gross inflation (pit = Πˆt) and xt represents the output gap:
xt = Yˆt − Yˆ nt (3.14)
We could have introduced behavioral agents on the firm side like in Gabaix’s behav-
ioral New Keynesian model but all this really does is lower the β parameter. It doesn’t
qualitatively change the resulting model.
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3.4.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
We assume the central bank pursues a simple Taylor Rule where it represents log-linearised
gross nominal interest (it = Iˆt):
it = φpipit (3.15)
In equilibrium, we set that there are no bonds so Bt = 0.
3.4.4 Equilibrium
We know that in equilibrium all output is consumed so:
Yt = Ct (3.16)
Log-linearising equation (3.16) yields:
Yˆt = Cˆt (3.17)
Note that even if there are no future shocks the path that agents decide at time t may
not be what they do at t+1 because we allow for the possibility of non-rational expectations
3.4.5 Rewriting the Household Problem






. We use the general notation that Xˆt =
log(Xt)− log(X¯). We can then log-linearise equations (3.9) and (3.10) to yield:
Ebt [Cˆt+1] = Cˆt + γEbt [Rˆt+1] (3.18)
Rˆt+1 = Iˆt − Πˆt+1 (3.19)
We define real bonds to be bt =
Bt
Pt−1
. We can rewrite the budget constraint (equa-
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tion (3.8)) in real terms as:
Ct + bt+1 = Yt +Rtbt (3.20)












Since there are no bonds in equilibrium, bt = 0. We then take expectations at t and

















By equation (3.16), C¯ = Y¯ . We then take behavioral expectations at t and substitute

































3.5 Behavioral IS Curve
In section 3.4, we derived the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (equation (3.13)) and defined
a monetary policy curve (equation (3.15)). To get a full New Keynesian model, we need to
derive an IS curve. We consider the derivation of the IS curve under different behavioral























3.5.1 No Behavioral Features

























By applying equation (3.17), we can simplify equation (3.26) to become:
Cˆt = Et[Cˆt+1]− σEt[Rˆt+1] (3.27)
We define rnt to be the ex-ante log-linearised natural real interest rate i.e. r
n
t = Et[Rˆnt+1].
Applying equation (3.19) to equation (3.27) and then subtracting the natural version (the
version without price rigidities) of equation (3.27) yields:
xt = Et[xt+1]− σ(it − Et[pit+1]− rnt ) (3.28)
Equation (3.28) is just the standard IS equation. Without behavioral features, the New
Keynesian model is then characterized by equations (3.13), (3.15) and (3.28).
3.5.2 Standard Sparse Dynamic Programming
In this section, we apply the same form of sparse dynamic programming as in Gabaix (2018).
Effectively, this assumes that if a variable is observed i periods from now, the agent only
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captures M i of the deviation from steady state of this variable. Mathematically, we set:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = M iEt[Yˆt+i]
Ebt [Rˆt+i+1] = M iEt[Rˆt+i+1] (3.29)
Note that, even though agents have agents have imperfect expectations, their expecta-
tions still partly depend upon rational expectations. One explanation is that the behavioral
agents fully understand the structure of the world in which they live and construct rational
forecasts taking into account their behavioral biases. However, it seems counterintuitive
that agents can construct rational forecasts but possess behavioral expectations. A more
reasonable explanation is that there exists a forecaster who understands the structure of the
world, including the behavioral part of agents’ expectations, and is able to construct rational
forecasts. Therefore, we are assuming that the behavioral agents partly take into account
what the forecaster predicts but also partly base their expectations upon a default model.

























By applying equation (3.17), we can simplify equation (3.31) to become:
Cˆt = MEt[Cˆt+1]− σEt[Rˆt+1] (3.32)
Applying equation (3.19) to equation (3.32) and then subtracting the natural version of
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equation (3.32) yields the following IS curve:
xt = MEt[xt+1]− σ(it − Et[pit+1]− rnt ) (3.33)
Equation (3.33) is the same as equation (3.28) except that the future output gap is
discounted by M . With standard sparse dynamic programming, the New Keynesian model
is then characterized by equations (3.13), (3.15) and (3.33).
3.5.3 Long-Run Sparse Dynamic Programming
In this section, we apply the form of long-run sparse dynamic programming introduced in
this paper. In particular, we set that the agent’s expectations of income are as follows:
Ebt [Yˆt+i] = M iEt[Yˆt+i] + (1−M i)µYˆ ,t
where:
µYˆ ,t = αYˆ Yˆt−1 + (1− αYˆ )µYˆ ,t−1 (3.34)
We only apply long-run sparse dynamic programming to income. We continue to assume
that expectations of the real interest rate satisfy equation (3.29). The reasons we do this is
because it leads to easier Math and because this is all we need to get very different results
to the standard Behavioral New Keynesian model in Gabaix (2018).
As in section 3.5.2, agents partly base their expectations upon the true rational expec-
tations. A reasonable explanation for where these rational expectations come from is that
there exists a forecaster who understands the structure of the world, including the nature
of agents’ expectations, and construct rational forecasts from this. Agents then partly base
their expectations on these rational forecasts but also upon their long run beliefs.
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By applying equation (3.17), we can simplify equation (3.37) to become:




R¯−M Et[µYˆ ,t+1]− σEt[Rˆt+1]
Adding and subtracting M 1−M
R¯−MµYˆ ,t from section 3.5.3 yields:
Cˆt = MEt[Cˆt+1] + (1−M)µYˆ ,t −M
1−M
R¯−M (Et[µYˆ ,t+1]− µYˆ ,t)− σEt[Rˆt+1] (3.38)
Applying equations (3.14), (3.19) and (3.34) to equation (3.38) yields and then subtract-
ing the natural version of equation (3.32) yields the following IS curve:
xt = MEt[xt+1] + (1−M)µx,t −M 1−M




µx,t = αYˆ xt−1 + (1− αYˆ )µx,t−1 (3.40)















We can simplify this further by inputting equation (3.40) into equation (3.39)












Equation (3.41) is similar to equation (3.33) except that it accounts for the slow updating
of the irrational part of the agent’s expectations about future output. With long-run sparse
dynamic programming, the New Keynesian model is then characterized by equations (3.13),
(3.15), (3.40) and (3.41).
3.6 Determinacy in the Behavioral New Keynesian Model
3.6.1 Standard Behavioral New Keynesian Model
Gabaix (2018) demonstrates it is possible to get determinacy when φpi < 1, including for
a fixed interest rule, once we allow for standard sparse dynamic programming behavioral
features. I briefly review these results.
Theorem 5. In the Behavioral New Keynesian model based upon standard sparse dynamic
programming, φpi < 1 can yield determinacy and stability.
Proof. See appendix C.2.1.
Determinacy implies that there is a unique non-explosive expected path that can be
followed by variables in a model. In other words, there is indeterminacy if we can pick
any value for the current period output gap (xt) without the model exploding. Stability
implies that if we let the system run without shocks then it will converge to a non-explosive
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equilibrium.
In the rational case, when current output xt rises, expectations of the future output gap
Et[xt+1] do not rise by as much since higher future output means higher future inflation which
(with a fixed interest rate) lowers the real interest rate and raises output today relative to
the future. Therefore, we do not have determinacy (a unique equilibrium path) because
when output can rise today away from steady state by any amount without future output
then following an explosive path.
Once we allow for sparse dynamic programming i.e. M < 1, when xt rises, expectations
of the future output gap can rise by more than the rise in the output gap today. This is
because the only way agents will increase their output today is if it is rational to expect a
larger increase in output in the future. This is an explosive path since it requires expectations
of output to get larger further into the future. Thus, we see that allowing for behavioral
features can generate determinacy.
We can also see this Mathematically by simplifying the model by setting β = 0, φpi =
0, rnt = 0 to obtain a simpler Phillips Curve and a fixed interest rate rule. Inputting these





We observe that when M + σκ < 1 in equation (3.42), if xt 6= 0 then Et[xt+1] must
explode. The only way current output is greater than 0 is if future output grows explosively.
Therefore, in a non-explosive path, current output must be pinned down to 0.
It may seem strange that a rise of 1p.p. in output today can require a rise of more
than 1p.p. in the future in the Behavioral New Keynesian model. However, Behavioral New
Keynesian agents still conduct consumption smoothing. So, for agents to consume 1p.p.
more today they still need to believe that their consumption will rise in the future. Since
agents have limited attention to the future, they underestimate the degree to which output
will rise in the future. Therefore, there needs to be a larger increase in future output than
in the standard New Keynesian model to generate a 1p.p. increase in output today. If the
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degree of inattention is large enough then it can be that a 1p.p. rise in output requires a
more than 1p.p. rise in output in the future.
3.6.2 Long-Run Behavioral New Keynesian Model
Theorem 6 demonstrates that when the nominal interest rates responds less than one-to-
one to inflation, the model must never be determinate and stable. This implies that an
unreponsive nominal interest rate will not pin down inflation and thus that the economy will
be unstable at the zero lower bound.
Theorem 6. In the Behavioral New Keynesian model based upon long-run sparse dynamic
programming, φpi ≤ 1 is never determinate and stable.
Proof. See appendix C.2.2.
To see why, we set β = 0, φpi = 0, r
n
t = 0 to obtain a simpler Phillips Curve and a fixed
interest rate rule. Inputting these into equation (3.41) yields:
xt = (M˜ + σ˜κ)Et[xt+1] + (1− M˜)µx,t
where:
µx,t = αYˆ xt−1 + (1− αYˆ )µx,t−1
Therefore, to generate an increase in current output, future output would need to increase.
However, over time, the agent’s behavioral expectations of output would rise. Therefore, to
generate a rise in current output, output in the long-run is likely to need to rise by less than
the rise in current output. Thus, a rise in current output is not likely to require the economy
to follow an explosive path so the solution is indeterminate. This is similar to the standard
New Keynesian model but very different to the behavioral New Keynesian model where a
rise in current output requires the economy to follow an explosive path.
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3.7 Costs of Zero Lower Bound in the Behavioral New
Keynesian Model
We investigate the costs of being at the zero lower bound for a long period of time.
3.7.1 Standard Behavioral New Keynesian Model
We consider an experiment where the natural real rate of interest stays indefinitely at some
constant level low enough to force the economy to remain at the zero lower bound. When
rn < −pi?, it is necessary to set i < 0 to achieve stable inflation. This is not thought to be
possible due to the zero lower bound (at least not significantly below zero). So we consider
an experiment where rn < −pi? indefinitely.
We discuss how to compute this experiment in appendix C.3.1. We can show that the
costs of hitting the ZLB persistently can be bounded under standard sparse dynamic pro-
gramming. A 1p.p. fall in Et[xˆt+1] ceteris paribus implies a Mp.p. fall in xˆt where M < 1.
Therefore, even if the real interest rate is positive, agents do not react fully to the future
expected fall in the output gap. Therefore, the output gap can converge to some bounded
level given in appendix C.3.1.
This is very different to the baseline non-behavioral New Keynesian model where, under
rational expectations, the costs must intuitively be unbounded. A 1p.p. fall in Et[xˆt+1] ceteris
paribus implies a 1p.p. fall in xˆt. Therefore, if the real interest rises due to the central bank’s
inability to lower the nominal interest rate and thus the real interest rate (which would boost
current output), the output gap at t must be persistently non-neglibly lower than at t + 1.
We know this will continue indefinitely and therefore the costs of remaining at the zero lower
bound are unbounded.
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3.7.2 Long-Run Behavioral New Keynesian Model
In the long-term Behavioral New Keynesian model, the costs of the zero lower bound are
unbounded. We demonstrate this in appendix C.3.2.
The output gap cannot converge to some stable level that bounds the costs of the zero
lower bound, unlike in the standard Behavioral New Keynesian model. In the short-term,
the output gap may converge to some relatively stable level since agents don’t respond fully
now to output gaps in the future due to imperfect observation of the future. However, we
cannot converge to this output gap completely because in the long-term the expectations of
agents about their future income falls which lowers agents’ current output in a vicious cycle.
3.8 Conclusion
I introduce an alternative form of sparse dynamic programming that allows us to study how
behavioral features affect models in the long-term. I do this by letting go the assumption
in the Behavioral New Keynesian model that part of expectations always depend upon the
steady state. I instead consider a framework in which the imperfect part of expectations
within the behavioral framework slowly update according to agents’ observations. I apply
this to the New Keynesian model. Within this setup, some of the key results of the Behavioral
New Keynesian model reverse. It is no longer possible for a less than one-to-one response of
nominal interest rates to inflation (including a fixed nominal interest rate rule) to generate
determinacy and stability. This is the same as the New Keynesian model but the opposite
of the Behavioral New Keynesian model. And the zero lower bound produces unbounded
increasing costs. Again, this is the same as the New Keynesian model but the opposite of the
Behavioral New Keynesian model. Therefore, the question of how to resolve the apparent
paradoxes in the New Keynesian model at the zero lower bound remains open.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
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A.1 Intuition in a Simplified Model Details
In this section, additional details are provided relating to section 1.2.
A.1.1 Calvo Pricing: Inflation and the Markup
Here, the standard Calvo pricing setup is assumed and the relationship between inflation
and the markup is derived. This is an example of the inflation-markup relationship that is
discussed in section 1.2.1
There are a continuum of intermediate firms indexed by i which produce differentiated
intermediate goods. There is a competitive final goods firm with constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production with CES parameter σ. The final goods firm’s demand for


























Intermediate firms have some probability λ of updating their price each period. Firms
have the following maximisation problem:
max





















(1− λ)kβk((1− σ)P ?t −σYt+kP σ−1t+k + σMCt+kYt+kP ?t −σ−1Pt+kσ]]



























































1− (1− λ)Π¯σ (A.8)



















[1− (1− λ)Π¯σ−1] (A.9)
















which is a measure of the effective markup (this is explained in





Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)
] [
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β
]
(A.11)
Raising Π¯ increases the first square bracket but lowers the second. When β < 1, the
second square bracket dominates since Π¯−σ changes by more than Π¯1−σ so raising average
inflation lowers the markup.
By average markup, I’m effectively referring to the average markup weighted by sales.
This is why I get qualitatively different results to Ascari and Sbordone (2014) who consider
the non-weighted average markup and show that it can rise when inflation rises.
Formal: Raising Inflation Lowers the Markup The result that raising inflation lowers






Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β −
(1− σ)Π¯−σ
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ) −
σΠ¯−σ−1
Π¯−σ − (1− λ) +
σΠ¯−σ−1





Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)
] [
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β
]
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Concentrating on the first square bracket:
dm¯
dΠ¯
∝ − (1− σ)Π¯
−σ(1− λ)(1− β)
(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β)(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)) −
σΠ¯−σ−1(1− λ)(1− β)
(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))(Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β)









(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))(Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β)
Substitute out σ
σ−1 using equation (A.11) and rearrange to get:
dm¯
dΠ¯




∝ Π¯−σ(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))2 − m¯Π¯−σ−1(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ))2
m¯ ≥ 1 otherwise firms exit the market and dm¯
dΠ¯
is decreasing in m¯. Therefore, dm¯
dΠ¯
takes
its highest possible value when m¯ = 1. I show that even in this case dm¯
dΠ¯
< 0 and thus the
markup always decreases in inflation. Under m¯ = 1, simplify to yield:
dm¯
dΠ¯ m¯=1
∝ Π¯−3σ + (1− λ)2Π¯−σ − [Π¯1−3σ + Π¯−σ−1(1− λ)2]
dm¯
dΠ¯ m¯=1
∝ (Π¯− 1)((1− λ)2 − Π¯−2σ)
Then note that by equation (A.11) Π¯−σ ≥ 1 − λ since this is needed to guarantee m¯ is
positive. Thus, dm¯
dΠ¯
< 0 so I have demonstrated that when average inflation rises, the average
markup always falls under Calvo pricing when β < 1.
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A.1.2 Asset Demand with Price Dispersion
This section provides the derivation for the profit of the firm section 1.2.2 when prices are
dispersed.
Intermediate firms produce output Yi,t by a linear production function over labor Li,t:
Yi,t = Li,t (A.12)
Inputting equation (A.1) into equation (A.12) and aggregating yields:
Ytνt = Lt (A.13)





The real marginal cost MCt of intermediate firms is just their wage bill (Wt):
MCt = Wt (A.14)





Inputting equation (A.1) into equation (A.15) and aggregating (where we also apply
equation (A.2)) yields:







Next, we define mt to be
1
MCtνt
. We input this into equation (A.16):
Ωt = (1− 1
mt
)Yt (A.17)
We observe that mt represents the inverse of real costs of firms, which is a measure of the
average markup across firms. When mt = 1 (the competitive case), firms make no profits.
However, as the markup rises mt ↑, firms make higher profits.
Next, we multiply the RHS of equation (A.17) by Wt
MCt
(which equals 1 by equation (A.14)
and apply equation (A.13) before simplying:




Ωt = (mt − 1)Wt
Pt
Lt
We see that we get the same as the case without price dispersion.
A.1.3 OLG in a Non-Annualized Model
Figure A.1 shows the case where the OLG model is non-annualized, unlike figure 1.3 where
it is annualized. The real interest rate is very high since it represents the return from one
generation to the next.
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium under a Fall in the Markup: 2. OLG (Not Annualized)
A.2 Model Details
In this section, additional details are provided on the derivations of section 1.3.
A.2.1 Firms
Cost Minimisation Details
Intermediate firms minimise their costs. They face the following problem:
min
Ki,j,t,Li,j,t






Note that rt,Wt are real variables. Setting up a Lagrangean and solving yields:
(1 + τ)(rt + δ) = λi,j,tαAtKi,j,t
α−1Li,j,t1−α (A.18)
(1 + τ)Wt = λi,j,t(1− α)AtKi,j,tαLi,j,t−α (A.19)



















λi,j,t is the marginal cost after tax of production of the firm. This is constant for all firms
and is equal to the real marginal cost after tax of the firm. MCt is defined to be the marginal













Aggregation of Cost Minimisation Conditions Details

















Taking integrals and noting that the ratio
Ki,j,t
Li,j,t





































Applying the definition of marginal costs and inputting the lump sum transfer, equa-
tion (1.49) can be rewritten more simply as equation (A.23). Also note that the lump sum












































Ωt = Yt − YtMCtνt
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Rewriting Price Evolution Equations Details







































































Firm Price Maximisation Details
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σ − 1(1 + τ)MCj,t+k]] (A.28)









































































− Vj,t = 0


























A.3 Steady State Details
In this section, I provide the fuller derivations of the steady state. The conditions are
summarized in section 1.4.2
A.3.1 Markup and Inflation Target
Firstly, note that in steady state:
Π¯ = Π¯j = Π
?




in equation (B.12). Equation (2.29) can be rewritten to get a steady state equation for ν¯j






















































σ − 1(1 + τ)MC (A.34)








1− (1− λj) βR¯Π?σ−1





(1 + τ)MC (A.35)





can then be input from
















1− (1− λj)βfR¯ Π?σ−1





dj = 1 (A.37)





can then be found from equa-
tion (B.14). ν¯ can be backed out by its definition (equation (2.27)). m¯ can then be obtained
by its definition (equation (1.57))
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A.3.2 Relative Asset Supply
The total assets supply available for the household to hold are capital and the value of firms
given in equation (A.38).1
A¯s = (1 + n)K¯ + Z¯ (A.38)
Applying equation (1.26) to equation (1.29) in the steady state yields a standard equation
for the value of firms equation (A.39).
Z¯ =








Inputting equation (A.40) into equation (A.38) yields equation (A.41). Inputting equa-
tion (1.54) into equation (A.41) yields equation (A.42)
A¯s =









Equations (1.59) and (1.60) can be combined to find equation (A.43). Dividing equa-




(R¯− 1 + δ)K¯ (A.43)
a¯s =
m




1K¯ needs to be multiplied by the population growth from one period to the next since assets are the
assets that agents hold going forward to the next period. K¯ represents the per capita capital held at the
start of a period. To have K¯ at the start of the next period, households must save (1 + n)K¯ at the end of
the previous period.
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A.3.3 Relative Asset Demand
Relative Labor Applying arbitrage conditions on bonds and shares (equations (1.25)
and (1.29)) to equations (1.40) and (1.41) yields the result that assets held at the start of
t+ 1 are the assets that were saved at the end of period t plus the return R¯:
T¯ = R¯S¯p
We can then apply this to equation (1.43) to yield:





Next, iterate over equation (A.45) for a household from their first period of life to their





































Therefore, applying equation (A.47) to equation (A.49) yields an expression for consump-



















Relative consumption for each cohort i is defined to be consumption by that cohort






















Endogenous Labor Relative Labor Supply In the case with exogenous labor, relative
consumption for each cohort has been rewritten purely in terms of R¯. However, in the
case with endogenous labor L¯i
L¯






) needs to be rewritten in terms of R¯ only.
Substituting the labor-leisure condition (equation (1.28)) into the Euler condition (equa-










































































Inputting L¯0 from equation (A.57) into equation (A.55) yields the relative labor supplied


































This has some economic intuition. When R¯ is higher, agents supply relatively less labor
when they are old since they are already getting a high return on their savings so they don’t
need to work as much.
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Relative Asset Demand Relative assets by cohort are defined in the same way as the





Equation (A.60) can be rewritten in terms of relative assets and relative consumption




Note that a¯0 = a¯M = 0 (since agents start with zero assets and have no need for assets
when they are dead). Therefore, this yields M−1 equations from equation (A.60) and M−1
unknowns a¯1, . . . , a¯M−1. Thus, a¯i can be solved for by iterating over equation (A.60) starting
from the beginning or end.












Next, observe that the total relative asset demand is just given by the weighted sum
of the relative assets held by each cohort. This can be shown by dividing equation (A.61)
by labor income and applying the definition of relative assets and relative assets by cohort












Thus, it is possible to solve for a¯d using this process.
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A.4 Generalized OLG Theory
In this section, results on the steady state of a generalized life cycle model with monopolistic
firms are derived. To do this, the equilibrium of relative consumption is analyzed as opposed
to the equilibrium of relative assets.










































(R¯− 1 + δ)(1− α)
To begin, I show that the real interest rate must always be greater than the population
growth.
Theorem 7 (R¯ > 1 + n Required when m > 1). When m > 1, require R¯ > 1 + n for an
equilibrium to hold.






The value of shares must be non-negative in equilibrium i.e. Z¯ ≥ 0. By the arbitrage
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condition, it is also known that:






Observe that for Z¯ ≥ 0, it must be the case that R¯ ≥ 1 + n.
Next, it is demonstrated that there must always exist an equilibrium.
Theorem 8 (Existence of Equilibria). When m = 1, c¯d = c¯s.
When m > 1, there always exists an equilibrium when R¯ > 1 + n.
Proof. Note the following results:
• When R¯ = 1 + n, c¯d = 1.
• When m = 1, R¯ = 1 + n, c¯s = 1.
• When m > 1, R¯ = 1 + n, c¯s > 1.
• When R¯→∞, c¯d →∞.
• When R¯→∞, c¯s → m
1−α .
For an equilibrium, necessary condition c¯s = c¯d must be satisfied.
When m = 1 (competitive firms): Observe that c¯s = c¯d when R¯ = 1. This does not
automatically mean that there is a valid equilibrium at R¯ = 1 since we have not proved that
Z¯ ≥ 0 which is necessary for the equilibrium to seem realistic.
When m > 1 (monopolistic firms): Observe that when R¯ = 1, c¯d < c¯s but when R¯ is
large, c¯d > c¯s. Therefore, since c¯d, c¯s are continuous functions of R¯, there must be a point at
which they cross and thus there exists some R¯ > 1 + n where c¯d = c¯s.
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Next, it is shown that an equilibrium must always be dynamically efficient.
Theorem 9 (R¯ ≥ 1+n Guarantees Dynamic Efficiency). When R¯ ≥ 1+n, there is dynamic
efficiency. This implies that the equilibrium with monopolistic firms is always dynamically
efficient.
Proof.












− (δ + n)
=
R¯− 1 + δ
MCν¯
− (δ + n)
= m(R¯− 1 + δ)− (δ + n)
This is greater than 0 when R¯ > 1 + n.
A.5 Calibration Details
In this section, I provide more details on the calibration which was explained in section 1.4.5.
A.5.1 Endogenous Labor Supply
Substituting the labor-leisure condition (equation (1.28)) into the Euler condition (equa-

































Set x0 = 1. To keep things simple, I just set xi∀i > 0 so that the labor supply is the






where the L¯ ratios are the same as in the exogenous labor case.
A.6 Results Details
In this section, I provide additional results relating to section 1.5 on what would happen if
the central bank were to raise inflation from 2 to 4 percent.
The extent to which changing the degree of firm discounting i.e. βf impacts the results
is given in table A.1.
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Table A.1: Impact of Changing Firm Discounting on the Policy Experiment Results
Firm Additional Discount (βf ) 0.89 0.935 0.972 1
Change in markup (p.p.) -1.45 -1.07 -0.68 -0.32
Change in Cold
Cyoung
(%) -7.34 -5.12 -3.10 -1.39
Change in r (p.p.) -0.54 -0.38 -0.23 -0.10
Change in K (%) 6.43 4.44 2.66 1.19
The values of βf in table A.1 were picked to correspond to: βf is the average discounting
above the expected real rate that Jagannathan et al. (2016); Graham and Harvey (2011,
2012) actually find in their surveys; βf = 0.935 is the average discounting from WACC
which is the value that is actually used; 1/0.972− 1 was the average real rate paid by prime
borrowers relative minus the average risk free rate between 1995 and 2007.
As the degree of discounting increases, the equilibrium real rate falls by more. This is
because higher discounting means that firms care less about the future so lower the markup
by more when inflation rises.
A.7 Idiosyncratic Labor Model
In this section, I present an alternative household setup where households have a similar life
cycle structure but they face idiosyncratic labor shocks. This is an alternative parameter-
ization that is discussed in section 1.5. To avoid complications, it is assumed there is no
aggregate uncertainty. This assumption can be made since this model is only applied in the
case of a long-run (steady state) equilibrium.
A.7.1 Households
Household ages and the population are denoted in the same manner as section 1.3.1
Since there are idiosyncratic shocks within cohorts, it is necessary to consider how indi-
viduals within a cohort will respond. For each cohort, there is a continuum of individuals
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denoted h between 0 and 1 for each cohort i.
An individual h of cohort i at time t has a budget constraint given by equation (A.66).
An agent either spends their money on consumption Ch,i,t or saves Sh,i+1,t+1 for the next
period. An agent receives direct income from working an exogenously set amount Lh,i,t at
time t for real wage W . Savings from the previous period pay a gross return of R.
Ch,i,t + Sh,i+1,t+1 ≤ WLh,i,t +RSh,i,t (A.66)
The amount that each individual works is dependent upon whether that household is
employed or unemployed:
Lh,i,t =
 Li,t if employedUi,t otherwise

Whether or not the individual is employed is a Markov process.
Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, all assets must return the same. Thus, there is
no need to specify exactly what assets agents hold for their savings. Instead, it can just be
specified that a household h in cohort i at time t has savings Sh,i,t without specifying which
assets they hold. Also, note that it is assumed that agents born today start with zero assets
(Sh,0,t = 0).
The agent has Epstein-Zin utility which allows the effects of risk aversion and income
elasticity of substitution to be separated. This means their utility is defined recursively.
Their relative risk aversion is denoted by γ and their intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is denoted by ρ:
Vi,t =
(














s.t. ∀i ∈ k, . . . ,M − 1:
Vi,t =
(





Ch,i,t + Sh,i+1,t+1 ≤ WLh,i,t +RSh,i,t (A.69)
SM,t+M ≥ 0
As in the main model, relative assets are used. A value function approach is required
due to the usage of Epstein Zin. This could be done using equations (A.68) and (A.69) but
then savings will be a function of the wage which is determined on the supply side. This
would require mean that it would be necessary to rerun the value function iteration each
time the markup is changed. Instead, like in the non-idiosyncratic shock case, assets and















s.t. ∀i ∈ k, . . . ,M − 1:
Vi,t =
(









2This has been simplified by cancelling a constant in the utility function.
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This then comes down to a series of value function problems. The value of savings and
labor income in the final period of the agent’s life is given by the utility of consuming all the
remaining assets of the agent:





Then, working backwards, the value of an agent of cohort i’s savings and labor income
can be computed using the value of an agent of cohort i+ 1’s savings and labor income.
Observe that si can be computed for every age given the value of R. Therefore, individual
relative savings is effectively a function of R. Consequently, the aggregate relative savings
















I have shown the derivation for the demand for relative assets. The supply of relative assets
and the relationship between the markup and inflation are the same as in appendix A.3
A.8 Empirics Robustness
In this section, I conduct robustness checks for the results presented in section 2.6. I discuss
these results at the end of that section.
OECD Members Pre-1975 The sample is reduced to consider only consider countries
that were members of the OECD before 1975.
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Table A.2: Relationship between Inflation and the Real Rate OECD Original Members
RealRate10yri,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.142** -0.169*** -0.546*** -0.909**
(0.047) (0.048) (0.072) (0.280)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 966 966 966 651
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Low Inflation (< 10%) The sample is reduced to consider only data points where long-
run inflation exceeded 10%.
Table A.3: Relationship between Inflation and the Real Rate Low Inflation
RealRate10yri,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.033 -0.059 -0.643*** -0.948***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.085) (0.171)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 1088 1088 1088 808
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Pre-2000 The sample is reduced to consider only before 2000.
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Table A.4: Relationship between Inflation and the Real Rate Pre-2000
RealRate10yri,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.323*** -0.354*** -0.426*** -0.451
(0.042) (0.034) (0.049) (NaN)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 558 558 558 253
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Post-2000 The sample is reduced to consider only 2000 and after.
Table A.5: Relationship between Inflation and the Real Rate Post-2000
RealRate10yri,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.228** -0.414*** -0.868*** -1.038***
(0.078) (0.093) (0.108) (0.153)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 593 593 593 580
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Spurious Regression Checks We consider differened variables in order to check for
spuriousness.
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Table A.6: Relationship between Inflation and the Real Rate Spurious Regression Difference
Check
∆RealInterest10yri,t (1) (2) (3)
∆Inflationi,t−4,t -0.611*** -0.702*** -0.850***
(0.057) (0.079) (0.100)
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 1116 1116 812
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
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Figure B.1: Inflation and the Profit Share in the US
Profit share is measured by corporate profits before tax (without IVA and CCAdj). Inflation is CPI
inflation.
B.1 Introduction Details
There is evidence of a negative relationship between inflation and firm profits in US data.
We can observe a negative relationship between trend inflation and profitability in the US in
figure B.1. In the 1960s and early 1970s, inflation remained subdued while profits were high.
However, after inflation rose in the late 1970s, profits fell. As inflation has fallen steadily
since 1990, corporate profits have risen again.
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B.2 Simple Model Additional Details
B.2.1 Log Linearization of Calvo




σ−1M¯C. Also note that M¯t,t+j = β
j. We
















































Next, we note that by equation (C.2):
P 1−σt+1 = λP
?
t+1















1To simplify this log-linearisation, note that if
∑K













Inputting equation (C.7) into equation (C.6) yields:
1− λ
λ









B.2.2 Log Linearization of Rotemberg
We can log-linearize equation (2.18) to yield:





Therefore, we get the same log-linearized Phillips Curve as in the Calvo case (equa-
tion (B.4)) when Π¯ = 1 (and thus M¯C = σ−1
σ






1− λ = κcalvo (B.5)
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B.3 Determinants of Long Run Relationship Additional
Details
B.3.1 Proof of theorem 1








Π¯1−σ − (1− λ) −
(1− σ)Π¯−σ
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β +
σΠ¯−σ−1
Π¯−σ − (1− λ) −
σΠ¯−σ−1





Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)
Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β
] [
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β
Π¯−σ − (1− λ)
]




∝ − (1− σ)Π¯
−σ(1− λ)(1− β)
(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)β)(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ)) −
σΠ¯−σ−1(1− λ)(1− β)
(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))(Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β)










(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))(Π¯−σ − (1− λ)β)
Define m¯ = 1
M¯Cν¯
and then substitute out terms in the second addition term using equa-









∝ Π¯−σ(Π¯−σ − (1− λ))2 − m¯Π¯−σ−1(Π¯1−σ − (1− λ))2
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is decreasing in m¯. Therefore, dm¯
dΠ¯
takes its highest possible value when m¯ = 1. I show that even in this case dm¯
dΠ¯
< 0 and thus








∝ (Π¯− 1)((1− λ)2 − Π¯−2σ)
Then note that by equation (A.10), Π¯−σ ≥ 1 − λ since this is needed to guarantee m¯ is
positive. Thus, dm¯
dΠ¯
< 0 so I have demonstrated that when average inflation rises, the average
markup always falls under Calvo pricing when β < 1.
B.3.2 Menu Costs Additional Figures
Figure B.2 shows how raising inflation affects the probability of price rises and falls. Ap-
pendix B.3.2 shows how raising inflation affects the absolute size of price rises and price falls.
Figure B.4 shows how raising inflation affects the reset price and the inaction region under
a productivity of approximately Ai = 1.
B.3.3 Degree of Monetary Non-Neutrality
A key determinant of the degree to which raising inflation lowers the markup is the degree
of monetary non-neutrality. This makes sense since if firms are reluctant to change their
prices then when inflation rises, they will set lower average markups. In figures B.5 to B.7,
we observe that an increase in monetary non-neutrality through respectively a fall in the
frequency of price change (λ), a rise in the convex cost of price adjustment (µ) or a rise in
the menu cost (µ) means that a fall in inflation from 2% to 0% raises the profit share by
more.
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Figure B.2: Inflation and Frequency of Price Change Relationship
Figure B.3: Inflation and Size of Absolute Price Change Relationship
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Figure B.4: Inflation and Inaction Region Relationship
Notes: This graph represents the policy function for a firm with productivity Ai = 1.
B.4 Extended Model Details
B.4.1 Multi-Sector Calvo Steady State Derivation




























Figure B.5: Change in Profit Share when Inflation Falls from 2% to 0% Under Different




















σ − 1MCj,t+k]] (B.10)






















σ − 1MCj,t+k]] (B.11)
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Figure B.6: Change in Profit Share when Inflation Falls from 2% to 0% Under Different
Extent of Rotemberg Costs
Now, let’s consider the steady state. Firstly, note that in steady state:
Π¯ = Π¯j = Π
?




in equation (B.12). Equation (2.29) can be rewritten to get a steady state equation for ν¯j






















Figure B.7: Change in Profit Share when Inflation Falls from 2% to 0% Under Different
Extent of Menu Costs




















can then be input from






















dj = 1 (B.16)





can then be found from equa-
tion (B.14). ν¯ can be backed out by its definition (equation (2.27)).
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B.5 Empirics Robustness
In this section, I conduct robustness checks for the results presented in section 2.6. I discuss
these results at the end of that section.
OECD Members Pre-1975 The sample is reduced to consider only consider countries
that were members of the OECD before 1975.
Table B.1: Relationship between Inflation and the Labor Share OECD Original Members
LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t 0.269 0.517* 0.164 0.351
(0.406) (0.235) (0.441) (0.974)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 584 584 584 500
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Low Inflation (< 10%) The sample is reduced to consider only data points where long-
run inflation exceeded 10%.
Table B.2: Relationship between Inflation and the Labor Share Low Inflation
LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.061 0.719** 0.753* 0.514
(0.512) (0.242) (0.312) (0.416)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 745 745 745 678
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Pre-2000 The sample is reduced to consider only before 2000.
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Table B.3: Relationship between Inflation and the Labor Share Pre-2000
LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t 0.180* 0.211*** 0.200*** 0.074
(0.080) (0.043) (0.048) (NaN)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 286 286 286 198
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Post-2000 The sample is reduced to consider only 2000 and after.
Table B.4: Relationship between Inflation and the Labor Share Post-2000
LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflationi,t−4,t -0.886 0.867*** 1.049*** 0.856*
(0.804) (0.254) (0.282) (0.339)
country dummies * * *
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 527 527 527 523
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
Spurious Regression Checks We consider differened variables in order to check for
spuriousness.
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Table B.5: Relationship between Inflation and the Labor Share Spurious Regression Differ-
ence Check
∆LaborSharei,t (1) (2) (3)
∆Inflationi,t−4,t 0.189*** 0.187*** 0.177***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.052)
year dummies * *
econ controls *
N 781 781 707
Notes: ?, ?? and ??? respectively represent p < 0.05, p < 0.01 and p < 0.001. The numbers in parentheses
represent the clustered standard errors.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
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C.1 Model Setup Details
C.1.1 Firm Details
CES Aggregator Firm
We have a competitive aggregator firm which produces final goods from a continuum of






























Intermediate goods firms have a linear production function over labor:
Yi,t = AtLi,t

















di = 0 yields:
Yˆt = Aˆt + Lˆt (C.3)





Log linearising equation (C.10) yields:
M̂Ct = Wˆt − Aˆt (C.5)
Intermediate Goods Pricing
Each intermediate goods firm is monopolistic. It sets a price Pi,t taking into account the
demand for its good from the final goods firm. It only changes its price with probability λ.


















































































σ−1M¯C. Also note that M¯t,t+j = β
j.
















































Next, we note that by equation (C.2):
P 1−σt+1 = λP
?
t+1







Π1−σt+1 + (1− λ)
1To simplify this log-linearisation, note that if
∑K




















Inputting equation (C.7) into equation (C.6) yields:
1− λ
λ









Substituting out the Marginal Cost




Cˆt + ηLˆt − Aˆt (C.10)




+ η)Yˆt − (1 + η)Aˆt (C.11)
In the case where there are no price rigidities, which we denote with a superscript n,
intermediate goods firms will always set their marginal cost to equal σ−1
σ
. Therefore, without




+ η)Yˆ nt − (1 + η)Aˆt (C.12)
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Inputting equation (C.13) into equation (C.9) yields:







C.2.1 Proof of Theorem 5
To consider stability/determinacy, we need to analyze the full system of equations i.e. equa-
tions (3.13), (3.15) and (3.33). We simplify by inputting equation (3.15) into equation (3.33).
We then rearrange to get:
Et[Zt+1] = AZt
where Zt = (xt, pit)
′:
A =









xt+1, pit+1 are both controls. Therefore, for determinacy and stability, we require that the
eigenvalues of A are greater than 1.













































When λ is very negative or positive, the first λ2 term dominates. The minimum of P can














We see that λmin > 1. We also observe that if P has complex roots a +
√
bi, a − √bi
then P (λ) = (λ − a − √bi)(λ − a +√bi) = (λ − a)2 + b. We observe that P is minimized
when λ = a so a = λmin. Therefore, in the case where we have complex roots, the system is
determinate.
Since P is falling at λ = 1 but increases above λmin, this implies that both eigenvalues
are greater than one iff P (1) > 0. Therefore, we have determinacy iff P (1) > 0 which is
shown in equation (C.14). When M = 1, we require φpi > 1 to get P (1) > 0. However, when
we allow M < 1, we no longer require φpi > 1 to get P (1) > 0 and we can even get P (1) > 0












(φpi − 1) (C.14)
C.2.2 Proof of Theorem 6
To consider stability/determinacy, we need to analyze the full system of equations i.e. equa-
tions (3.13), (3.15), (3.40) and (3.41). We simplify this system by inputting equation (3.15)
























αy 0 1− αy

xt, pit are controls while µx,t is a state. Let’s denote the three eigenvalues by λ1, λ2, λ3
and r(λ) represents the real component of λ. To get a unique, stable solution we require
that |r(λ1)| < 1, |r(λ2)|, |r(λ3)| > 1. If |r(λ1)|, |r(λ2)|, |r(λ3)| ≥ 1 then we have instability. If
|r(λ1)|, |r(λ2)| ≤ 1 then we have indeterminacy.
We have the following characteristic equation:


















+ 1− αy) + 1
β
































Lemma 10 (P (1) > 0 is a Necessary Condition for Determinacy). P is a cubic polynomial
with a positive coefficient on the cubic term: If P (1) ≤ 0 then there cannot exist one root of
the polynomial with real part strictly less than 1 and two roots with real part strictly greater
than 1.
Proof. We proceed a proof by contradiction. We consider three cases.
Firstly, if P (1) = 0 then 1 is a root and we require roots strictly less/greater than 1 so
this cannot satisfy the stated condition.
Secondly, we consider the case where all roots are real. In this case, P (λ) crosses zero
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three times. We denote these λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ3. Since the coefficient on the cubic term in the
polynomial is positive, when λ < λ1, P (λ) < 0 and when λ > λ3, P (λ) > 0. Therefore,
at points satisfying λ1 < λ < λ2, P (λ) > 0 and at points satisfying λ2 < λ3, P (λ) < 0.
Therefore, we see that if P (1) < 0 we must either have at 1 < λ1 so all roots are greater
than 1 or λ2 < 1 < λ3 so exactly one root is greater than 1. Therefore, it is not possible
that with three real roots and P (1) < 0 that we have exactly one root which is strictly less
than 1.
Thirdly, if P has complex roots then it must have exactly two (since they come in pairs)
i.e. λ2 = b+ ci, λ3 = b− ci. We can then write:
P (λ) = (λ− λ1)(λ− b− ci)(λ− b+ ci)
P (λ) = (λ− λ1)((λ− b)2 + c2) (C.16)
We see from equation (C.16) that if P (1) < 0 then a > 1 (since the second bracket is
strictly positive). In this case, we must have that either b < 1 in which case there are exactly
two roots with real parts strictly less than 1 or b > 1 in which case there are exactly zero
roots with real parts strictly less than 1. Therefore, we see that if P (1) < 0 and we have
complex roots that we cannot have exactly one root strictly less than 1.
Equation (C.17) shows the characteristic equation evaluated at 1. We see that P (1) > 0
only when φpi > 1. Therefore, by lemma 10, the only way it is possible to get exactly one
root with real part strictly less than 1 and two roots with real part strictly greater than 1 is





κσ(φpi − 1) (C.17)
2Under φpi ≤ 1, there are parameter values for which we get indeterminacy and there are parameter
values for which we get stability.
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C.3 Costs of Zero Lower Bound
C.3.1 Costs of Zero Lower Bound in Standard Behavioral New
Keynesian Model
Call rz the low level of r that the economy gets stuck at indefinitely. We must have that:
rz < −pi?
Then, denoting iˆz to be the value that iˆz takes at the zero lower bound:
rˆz ≤ −pi? − rn = −i¯ = iˆz
We set rˆz − iˆz = −0.01. We can then behavioral IS curve as:
xˆt = MEt[xˆt+1]− σ(0.01− Et[pˆit+1]) (C.18)
The NKPC stays the same.
We also note that when the ZLB does end and we return to normal then if we follow a
simple Taylor rule i.e. it = φpipit then we would need to have pit = 0 at the conclusion of the
ZLB and this would require xt = 0. We can then just work backwards from this final period
to simulate what will happen.
Another way of observing this is to observe that xˆ can converge to a steady state level.
The steady state of the IS and NKPC curves is respectively:
¯ˆx = M ¯ˆx− σ(0.01− ¯ˆpi)
¯ˆpi = κ¯ˆx+ β ¯ˆpi
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Combining these:








As long as the term in square brackets is positive, ¯ˆx will converge.
C.3.2 Costs of Zero Lower Bound in Long-Term Behavioral New
Keynesian Model
We provide a sketch proof.
If µ¯xˆ = 0 then:








However, this implies that the long-term expectatons of xˆ should actually be:




And if we input this into equation (C.19) then we’ll get that ¯ˆx is lower and thus µ¯xˆ falls.
And this continues indefinitely.
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